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ABSTRACT
In computer science, functional software testing is a method of ensuring that software
gives expected output on speciﬁc inputs. Software testing is conducted to ensure desired
levels of quality in light of uncertainty resulting from the complexity of software. Most
of today’s software is written by people and software development is a creative activity.
However, due to the complexity of computer systems and software development processes,
this activity leads to a mismatch between the expected software functionality and the
implemented one. If not addressed in a timely and proper manner, this mismatch can cause
serious consequences to users of the software, such as security and privacy breaches, ﬁnancial
loss, and adversarial human health issues. Because of manual eﬀort, software testing is costly.
Software testing that is performed without human intervention is automatic software testing
and it is one way of addressing the issue.
In this work, we build upon and extend several techniques for automatic software testing.
The techniques do not require any guidance from the user. Goals that are achieved with
the techniques are checking for yet unknown errors, automatically testing object-oriented
software, and detecting malicious software. To meet these goals, we explored several tech-
niques and related challenges: automatic test case generation, runtime veriﬁcation, dynamic
symbolic execution, and the type and size of test inputs for eﬃcient detection of malicious
software via machine learning.
Our work targets software written in the Java programming language, though the tech-
niques are general and applicable to other languages. We performed an extensive evaluation
on freely available Java software projects, a ﬂight collision avoidance system, and thousands
of applications for the Android operating system. Evaluation results show to what extent
dynamic symbolic execution is applicable in testing object-oriented software, they show
correctness of the ﬂight system on millions of automatically customized and generated test
cases, and they show that simple and relatively small inputs in random testing can lead to
eﬀective malicious software detection.
To Lucija, my love.
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Since the late twentieth century, we have been witnessing a shift in how society functions
by relying more and more on computing devices. Even though they come in diﬀerent form
factors and serve diﬀerent purposes, what is common to all computing devices is that they are
controlled by software. In other words, computing devices are programmed via software to do
certain tasks. Today’s software accomplishes complex tasks such as ﬂying an aircraft. Other
tasks include telecommunication operation, navigation, concert ticket reservation, email
client, and calendar organizer. Without doubt, software has enhanced people’s everyday
lives and work.
Software has to be written and consequently maintained. These two challenging and
creative activities are commonly referred to as software development, which is performed
by people. Software development is carried out by both individuals and small and large
groups, facilitated by existing software tools. To deal with complexity of software, software
developers organize software that they are working on in layers of increasing abstraction.
The lowest layer communicates with hardware and provides services to upper layers by
abstracting away hardware speciﬁcs. The highest layers provide users with services such
as video calls. In spite of such organization of software, each layer is still rather complex.
Decades of software development have shown that the complexity of software inevitably leads
to it malfunctioning, which can have serious consequences to its users, including security
and privacy breaches, ﬁnancial loss, and adverse human health issues.
Because developing software with no unwanted behavior is extremely hard, developers
try to minimize the number of such behaviors and their impact. One viable approach
to addressing this quality challenge is software veriﬁcation. It consists of writing a formal
speciﬁcation of what the target software should do and then proving that the implementation
of the target software corresponds to the speciﬁcation. Proving even a simple speciﬁcation
2typically requires much more proof theory knowledge and time than software developers
have, hence this approach is rarely taken.
Another approach is software testing. It is a common approach to ﬁnding errors and
unwanted behavior in software and making sure no regressions are introduced. It consists
of providing software with known-in-advance input and checking if it produces expected
output. When an input is found that makes software produce an unexpected output, i.e.,
an error occurs, the software is ﬁxed and the process is repeated. The ideal goal is to cover
all possible inputs to make sure no errors are possible. However, for any nontrivial software
there are far too many inputs to cover in a limited amount of time. Therefore, only some
inputs are tested for.
Software testing is done either completely manually or semi-automatically by having
a domain expert guide a testing tool. When done manually, testers take the role of end
users and use software trying to discover errors, while developers write test cases that cover
particular inputs. In a semi-automatic case, a domain expert speciﬁes what and how to
test such that a testing software tool can perform tasks that are otherwise done manually.
In both cases, software testing turns out to be overwhelmingly time-consuming. Therefore,
there is a need for automatic testing.
There are beneﬁts to testing in an automatic fashion: 1) it reduces time needed for
testing, 2) it can be replayed on diﬀerent variants of the same software, and 3) it reduces
human error that can happen in testing. Towards automating the testing process, developers
write auxiliary software that tests target software. Such auxiliary software presents the
target software with speciﬁc inputs that developers have thought of and decided to test it
on. Nevertheless, that leaves a lot of inputs uncovered, i.e., it leaves a lot of room for inputs
that can make the target software behave unexpectedly. As illustrated earlier, software plays
increasingly more important roles in our lives, yet dominant practices in ensuring desired
software quality are time-consuming and suboptimal.
An extended solution to addressing this quality challenge is to perform automatic soft-
ware testing. There are two parts to automatic testing: 1) generating inputs, and 2) checking
if desired properties hold for generated inputs. To utilize automatic testing, developers have
to formulate properties that software under test should have, encode them in a software
implementation, think of domains over which inputs to be generated should range, and
3implement generators for inputs. Such testing can reveal misconceptions about desired
software behavior as well as undesired behavior like errors and security threats that are
triggered on inputs that would otherwise be left untested.
In this dissertation, we consider several techniques for automatic software testing and
broaden their applicability. They address the challenge of identifying previously unknown
errors and security threats in software. The techniques are automatic, i.e., they do not
require interaction with the user. In addressing diﬀerent problems, we investigate several
techniques and related challenges: automatic test case generation, runtime veriﬁcation,
dynamic symbolic execution, and the type and size of test inputs for eﬃcient detection of
malicious software via machine learning. All of these techniques increase software reliability
and security.
One of the main goals of this work is to make the techniques work at the scale of real-
world software, without impeding the usability of the techniques or having to substantially
instrument the software under analysis. This goal is important if the techniques are to be
applicable to such complex software. All three lines of work required no modiﬁcation of
the software under analysis. This enables developers of the software to retain their usual
development processes while also providing the beneﬁt of automatically ﬁnding errors in the
software.
The scalability goal in some of the techniques was achieved by combining existing
methods in novel ways. In one line of work, we used random testing to dynamically analyze
software executions. For each application considered, we chose a parameterized number
of sampled inputs that served as application execution drivers. These inputs mimicked
user interaction with the application. While each application was executing, we traced its
system calls that occurred due to the provided inputs. Then we repeated this for thousands
of applications, processed each application’s system calls, and used that in machine learning
to gain an insight into what makes an application malicious. Therefore, we used automatic
testing to observe application maliciousness that was automatically modeled via machine
learning techniques.
Similarly, automatic testing of object-oriented software was accomplished by interleav-
ing feedback-directed random testing and dynamic symbolic execution. One of the main
challenges in automatically testing object-oriented software is construction of appropriate
4objects in the heap memory, which would serve as input to the rest of the program. When
interleaved, the two techniques enabled us to deal with the sheer number of diﬀerent
executions that dynamic symbolic execution would have to explore on its own otherwise.
With feedback-directed random testing, we ﬁrst construct multiple execution paths that
created objects and invoked methods on them. Then we applied dynamic symbolic execution
to explore paths that branch oﬀ of the constructed paths. Therefore, the interleaving
approach provided us with an ability to sample from inputs and explore execution paths
that they can result in.
In the line of work on verifying at runtime an aircraft separation assurance system, we
veriﬁed properties by monitoring test cases during their execution. There we used a novel
approach in generating inputs of interest. Inputs in this line are aircraft trajectories, where
each trajectory is a sequence of points in space and time. It is a four-dimensional space,
where three dimensions are an aircraft’s latitude, longitude, and height position, while the
remaining one is time when an aircraft was at that position. The main challenge there is
to create a property-covering scenario with multiple in-ﬂight aircraft and their trajectories.
Because simply sampling from the input space of multiple trajectories is extremely likely
to give an uninteresting input on which to test and verify properties, an approach that
would ﬁnd interesting inputs was needed. Our solution was to create somewhat interesting
trajectories ﬁrst, provide them as input to the system, monitor and learn from executions,
and then create more interesting and complex test cases at runtime.
This dissertation is organized around three lines of work. In the ﬁrst part of the
dissertation, we analyze how the type and size of inputs in random testing aﬀects malware
detection abilities for a widely used mobile computing operating system. In the second
part, we look at the problem of automatically testing object-oriented software. Our work
addresses the problem by combining feedback-directed random testing and dynamic symbolic
execution. The last part is on runtime veriﬁcation of a complex real-world software system.
There we consider how runtime monitoring can be interleaved with automatic test case
generation in order to target property coverage. With that said, our thesis statement is the
following:
Automatic software testing can be combined with machine learning, dynamic
symbolic execution, and runtime veriﬁcation to broaden its applicability.
5We implemented the techniques for software written in the Java programming language.
The benchmarks on which we evaluated our techniques include dozens of freely available
Java software projects, a ﬂight collision avoidance system, and thousands of applications
for the Android operating system. Such a wide spectrum of benchmarks and their size and
complexity demonstrate the broad applicability of the proposed automatic software testing
techniques. The results of our work show that: 1) simple inputs in random testing can
be used to eﬀectively detect malicious software, 2) for object-oriented software, dynamic
symbolic execution provides additional code coverage on top of feedback-directed random
testing, and 3) the correctness of a ﬂight system can eﬃciently be tested on millions of
automatically customized and generated test cases.
CHAPTER 2
AUTOMATIC TESTING FOR MALWARE
DETECTION
This chapter is based on work published at the International Workshop on Security And
Privacy Analytics 2016 [DAUR16a] and on the accompanying technical report [DAUR15].1
2.1 Introduction
The global market for mobile devices has exploded in the past several years, and accord-
ing to some estimates, the number of smartphone users alone reached 1.7 billion worldwide in
2014. Android is the most popular mobile platform, holding nearly 85% of the global smart-
phone market share. One of the main advantages of mobile devices such as smartphones is
that they allow for numerous customizations and extensions through installing applications
from public application repositories. The largest of such repositories (e.g., Google Play and
the Apple App Store) have more than one million applications available for download each,
and there are more than 100 billion mobile device applications installed worldwide.
This clearly provides a fertile environment for malicious activities, including the de-
velopment and distribution of malware. A recent study [jun13] estimates that the total
amount of malware across all mobile platforms grew exponentially at the rate of 600%
between 03/2012 and 03/2013. Around 92% of the malware applications found in this
study target Android. In a related study [ris14], similar statistics are reported — the
number of malicious applications in the Google Play store grew around 400% from 2011 to
2013, while at the same time, the percentage of malicious applications removed annually by
Google has dropped from 60% in 2011 to 23% in 2013. Due to the sharp increase in the
total amount of malware, the percentage of removed malware dropped signiﬁcantly despite
the fact that the absolute number actually increased from roughly 7,000 in 2011 to nearly
1Portions of the published work are reused and reprinted here with permission.
710,000 in 2013. Alcatel-Lucent estimates the mobile malware infection rate to be around
0.65%, which means that around 15 million mobile devices are infected with malware, 60%
of which run Android [alc14]. A recent research paper found that the malware infection
rates in Android devices are 0.28% and 0.26%, depending on the chosen malware data
set [TLN+14]. While companies such as Google regularly scan their application repositories
using proprietary tools, this process is often ineﬀective as the above numbers illustrate.
There are also unoﬃcial, open repositories where often no scanning is performed, partially
because there is a lack of solid freely available solutions and tools. As a consequence,
Android malware detection has been an active area of research in the past several years,
both in industry and academia.
Currently, published approaches can be broadly categorized into manual expert-based
approaches, and automatic static- or dynamic-analysis-based techniques. Expert-based
approaches detect malware by relying on manually speciﬁed malware features, such as
requested permissions [ADY13] or application signatures [GZZ+12, FADA14]. These require
signiﬁcant manual eﬀort by an expert user, are often easy to circumvent by malware writers,
and target existing, speciﬁc types of malware, thereby not providing protection from evolving
malicious applications.
Static-analysis-based techniques typically search for similarities to known malware. This
often works well in practice since new malware samples are typically just variations of existing
ones. Several such techniques look for code variations [CGC12, HHW+13], which becomes
ineﬀective when faced with advanced code obfuscation techniques. Hence, researchers have
been exploring more high-level properties of code that can be extracted statically, such
as call graphs [GYAR13], which make these techniques more resilient to code obfuscation.
Unfortunately, even those approaches can be evaded by leveraging well-known drawbacks of
static analysis. For example, generated call graphs are typically over-approximations, and
hence can be obfuscated by adding many dummy, unreachable function calls. In addition,
native code is hard to analyze statically, and hence malicious behavior can be hidden there.
Dynamic analysis techniques typically run applications in a sandbox environment or on
real devices in order to extract information about the application behavior. The extracted
information is then automatically analyzed for malicious behavior using various techniques,
such as machine learning. Recent techniques is this category often observe application
8behavior by tracing system calls in a virtualized environment [BBS+10, RFC13, LBK+10].
Both static analysis and dynamic analysis proponents made various claims, often contra-
dicting ones — including claims that are based on questionably designed experiments — on
eﬀectiveness of malware detection based on system calls.
In this chapter, we evaluate existing and propose novel dynamic Android malware
detection techniques based on automatic testing and on tracking of system calls, all of
which we implemented as a free software tool called maline. Our work was initially
inspired by a similar approach proposed for desktop malware detection [PBCK13], albeit
we provide simpler feature encodings and an Android-speciﬁc tool ﬂow. We provide several
encodings of behavior ﬁngerprints of applications into features for subsequent classiﬁcation.
We performed an extensive empirical evaluation on a set of more than 12,000 Android
applications. We analyze how the quality of malware classiﬁers is aﬀected across several
dimensions, including the choice of an encoding of system calls into features, the relative
sizes of benign and malicious data sets used in experiments, the choice of a classiﬁcation
algorithm, and the size and type of inputs in automatic testing that drive a dynamic
analysis. Furthermore, we show that the structure of system call sequences observed during
application executions conveys in itself a lot of information about application behaviors. Our
evaluation sheds light on several such aspects, and shows that the proposed combinations
can be eﬀective: our technique yields an overall detection accuracy of 93% with a 5% benign
application classiﬁcation error. Finally, we provide guidelines for domain experts when
making choices on malware detection tools for Android, such as maline.
Our approach provides several key beneﬁts. By guarding the users at the repository
level, a malicious application is detected early and before it is made publicly available for
installation. This saves scarce energy resources on the devices by delegating the detection
task to a trusted remote party, while at the same time protecting users’ data, privacy, and
payment accounts. System call monitoring is out of reach of malicious applications, i.e.,
they cannot aﬀect the monitoring process. Hence, our analysis that relies on monitoring
system calls happens with higher privileges than those of malicious applications. In addition,
tracking system calls entering the kernel (and not calls at the Java library level) enables us to
capture malicious behavior potentially hidden in native code. Since our approach is based on
coupling an automatic testing-guided dynamic analysis with classiﬁcation based on machine
9learning, it is completely automatic. We require no source code, and we capture dynamic
behavior of applications as opposed to their code properties such as call graphs; hence, our
approach is mostly immune to common, simple obfuscation techniques. The advantages of
our approach make it complementary to many existing approaches, such as the ones based
on static analysis.
Our contributions are summarized as follows:
• We show that automatic testing can eﬀectively be applied to as disparate an area as
malware detection for mobile platforms.
• We propose a completely automatic approach to Android malware detection at the
application repository level using automatic testing, system call tracking, and clas-
siﬁcation based on machine learning, including a novel heuristics-based encoding of
sequences of system calls into features.
• We implement the approach in a tool called maline, and perform extensive empir-
ical evaluation on more than 12,000 applications. We show that maline eﬀectively
discovers malware with a very low rate of false positives.
• We compare several feature extraction strategies and classiﬁers. In particular, we
show that the eﬀectiveness of even very simplistic feature choices (e.g., the frequency
of system calls) is comparable to much more heavyweight approaches. Hence, our
results provide a solid baseline and guidance for future research in this area.
• Finally, we contribute 300 GB of data [DAUR16b] generated during this work, for
other researchers, teachers, and the general public to inspect, use, and build upon in
their work. For example, the data were already used in a teaching setting in a class at
the University of Utah where students built machine learning algorithms, which they
compared using our data.
2.2 Preliminaries
In this section, we introduce a problem deﬁnition and preliminaries for the problem.
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2.2.1 Problem Definition
We are provided with a set of Android applications prelabeled as either benign (good-
ware) or malicious (malware). In addition, we assume that each application can be classiﬁed
as benign or malicious based on its behavior, i.e., the actions it performs. The goal is to learn
behavioral characteristics of applications to be able to discriminate benign from malicious
ones in a new, yet unlabeled set.
2.2.2 System Calls
A system call is a mechanism for a program to request a service from the underlying
operating system’s kernel. In Android, system calls are created by information ﬂowing
through a multilayered architecture depicted in Figure 2.1. For example, an Android text
messaging application, located at the highest level of the architecture, might receive a user
request to send an SMS message. The request is transformed into a request to the Telephony
Manager service in the Application Framework. Next, the Android runtime receives the
request from the service, and it executes it in the Dalvik Virtual Machine.2 The execution
transforms it into a collection of library calls, which eventually result in multiple system
calls being made to the Linux kernel. One of the system calls will be to sendmsg:
sendmsg(int sockfd, const struct msghdr* msg, unsigned int flags)
The sendmsg function is used to send a message on a socket. The generated sequence of
system calls is a low-level equivalent of the SMS message being sent in the application at the
highest level of abstraction. Information ﬂows in the opposite direction in a similar fashion.
2.2.3 Automatic Testing
In our approach to malware detection, we heavily rely on automatic testing. We use a
form of random automatic testing where pseudo-random events are generated and provided
as inputs to an Android application or the Android system. Android applications are event-
driven; hence, the generated inputs drive the execution of applications. In this way, the
state of an application in its execution is changed based on the provided input. A sequence







Figure 2.1. Abstraction layers of the Android architecture.
of inputs will cause the application to go through a sequence of states. Consequently, this
reﬂects in a corresponding sequence of system calls that happen between the application
and the Android operating system.
In the testing phase of the malware detection approach, we vary the size and type of
generated inputs, which causes an application to go through diﬀerent states in its execution.
By varying the inputs, we can drive an application’s execution into diﬀerent end states. This
lets us observe at the system call level how the behavior of the application changes.
The Android Software Development Kit contains an automatic testing tool called Mon-
key [mon17]. Monkey generates pseudo-random events such as gestures, clicks, touches, as
well as system-level events. We leverage Monkey in the dynamic phase of our approach to
generate input events that drive the execution of an application.
2.2.4 Machine Learning
Our malware detection problem is an instance of a classiﬁcation problem in machine
learning, and is solved using a classiﬁer algorithm. More speciﬁcally, it is an example
of a binary classiﬁcation problem since it explores connections between the behavior of
an application and its goodware/malware label. The two groups are commonly called a
positive and a negative group. If a positive example (e.g., an application in our case) is
classiﬁed into the positive (i.e., respectively, negative) group, we obtained a true positive/TP
(i.e., respectively, false negative/FN). Analogously, we deﬁne true negative/TN and false
positive/FP. Table 2.1 gives standard measures of the quality of classiﬁcation prediction
used in machine learning based on these terms.
Classiﬁcation is usually conducted through individual measurable properties of a phe-
nomenon being investigated (e.g., the heights of people, their weights, or the number of
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Table 2.1. Standard classiﬁer quality measures. P (respectively, N) is the number of
positive (respectively, negative) examples.
Measure Formula
accuracy, recognition rate TP+TN
P+N
errorrate, misclassiﬁcation rate FP+FN
P+N
sensitivity, true positive rate, recall TP
P




system calls in one run of an Android application). Such properties are called features, and
a set of features of a given object is often represented as a feature vector. Feature vectors
are stored in a feature matrix, where every row represents one feature vector.
Cross-validation is a technique for estimating the performance of a predictive model. If
the validation is ﬁve-fold, it means that the input data are split into ﬁve disjoint subsets,
where each subset in turn is used as a testing subset. Finally, double ﬁve-fold cross-validation
means that the validation was performed for two parameters.
More about machine and statistical learning can be found in related literature [HTF09,
JWH13].
2.3 Our Approach
Our approach is a three-phase analysis, as illustrated in Figure 2.2. The ﬁrst phase is
a dynamic analysis where we track system calls3 during the execution of an application in
a sandbox environment and record them into a log ﬁle. In the second phase, we encode
the generated log ﬁles into feature vectors according to several representations we deﬁne.
The last phase takes the feature vectors and applies machine learning [HTF09] to learn to
discriminate benign from malicious applications. In both the second and third phase, we
look at multiple techniques, as explained in the remainder of this section.
3A system call is a mechanism for a program to request a service from the underlying operating system’s
kernel. In Android, system calls are created by information flowing through its multilayered architecture,
starting from an application on top; hence, they capture its behavior.
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system calls in a log ﬁle, is a sequence of instances of system calls σ = (q1, q2, . . . , qm), where
qi ∈ S is the ith observed system call in the log ﬁle. Such call sequences are passed to the
feature extraction phase.
2.3.2 Feature Extraction Phase
As explained earlier, how features are picked for the feature vector is important for
the machine learning classiﬁcation task. Therefore, we consider two representations for
generating a feature vector from a system call sequence σ. Our simpler representation is
concerned with how often a system call happens, while our richer representation encodes
information about dependencies between system calls. Both representations ignore system
call information other than their names and sequence numbers (e.g., invocation time, input
and output values), as can be seen from the deﬁnition of σ. Once we compute a feature
vector x for every application under analysis according to a chosen representation, we form
a feature matrix by joining the feature vectors such that every row of the matrix corresponds
to one feature vector.
2.3.2.1 System Call Frequency Representation
How often a system call occurs during an execution of an application carries information
about its behavior [BZNT11]. One class of applications might be using a particular system
call more frequently than another class. For example, some applications might be making
considerably more I/O operation system calls than known goodware, indicating that the
increased use of I/O system calls might be a sign of malicious behavior. Our simple system
call frequency representation tries to capture such features. In this representation, every
feature in a feature vector represents the number of occurrences of a system call during an
execution of an application. Given a sequence σ, we deﬁne a feature vector x = [x1x2 . . . x|S|],
where xi is equal to the frequency (i.e., the number of occurrences) of system call si in σ. In
the experiments in Section 2.5, we use the system call frequency representation as a baseline
comparison against the richer representation described next.
2.3.2.2 System Call Dependency Representation
Our system call dependency representation was inspired by previous work that has shown
that a program’s behavior can be characterized by dependencies formed through information
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ﬂow between system calls [FJC+10]. However, we have not been able to ﬁnd a tool for
Android that would provide us with this information and also scale to analyzing thousands
of applications. Hence, we propose a novel scalable representation that attempts to capture
such dependencies by employing heuristics. As we show in Section 2.5, even though our
representation is simpler than the one based on graph mining and concept analysis from
the original work [FJC+10], it still produces feature vectors that result in highly accurate
malware detection classiﬁers.
For a pair of system calls qi and qj in a sequence σ, where i < j, we deﬁne the distance
between the calls as d(qi, qj) = j−i. We then approximate a potential data ﬂow relationship
between a pair of system calls using the distance between the calls in a sequence (i.e., log ﬁle).
For example, if two system calls are adjacent in σ, their distance will be 1. Furthermore,
let wg,h denote the weight of a directed edge (sg, sh) in a system call dependency graph we
generate. The system call dependency graph is a complete digraph with the set of vertices
being the set of all the system call names S, and hence having |S|2 edges. Then, wg,h for a










where k is the minimal index such that qi = qk and i < k ≤ |σ|. Informally, the closer
the pair is in a sequence, the more it contributes to its edge weight in the graph. Hence,
instead of explicitly observing a data ﬂow between system calls, our representation captures
it implicitly: it is based on a simple observation that the closer a pair of system calls is in
a sequence, the more likely it is that there is a data ﬂow between the pair.
From a sequence σ, we compute weights wg,h for every system call pair (sg, sh) ∈ S2.
For g and h such that wg,h = 0, we still consider edge (sg, sh) to exist, but with a weight
of 0. Since each application is executed only once during our dynamic analysis phase, we
generate one system call dependency graph per application.
We generate a feature vector x of an application by taking edge weights from its system
call dependency graph. For every directed edge (sg, sh), there is a corresponding feature in
x, and hence the dimensionality of x is |S|2. Given a sequence σ, we deﬁne a feature vector
x = [x1x2 . . . x|S|2 ], where xi is equal to wg,h such that i = (g − 1) · |S|+ h. Informally, x is
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a linearization of the array corresponding to the system call dependency graph.
2.3.3 Machine Learning Phase
We use the generated feature vectors for our applications (i.e., feature matrices) together
with provided malware/goodware labels to build classiﬁers. We experimented with several
of the most popular and eﬀective classiﬁers: support vector machines (SVMs), random
forest (RF), LASSO, and ridge regularization [HTF09]. We used the double cross-validation
approach to tune parameters of classiﬁers.
When a probabilistic classiﬁer is used, a threshold that appropriately tunes the trade-oﬀ
between sensitivity and speciﬁcity can be studied using receiver operating characteristic
(ROC) curves [HTF09]. Generating ROC curves is especially valuable to the users of
malware detectors such as ours, since they can use them to ﬁne-tune sensitivity vs. speciﬁcity
depending on the intended usage. Hence, we generate ROC curves for the most interesting
classiﬁers.
In our data set, around 33% samples are malware and the rest are goodware. Although
this approach does not generate a perfectly balanced design, it tries to represent the good-
ware population in the best possible manner while still keeping a high percentage of malware
samples and keeping computational costs at a practical level. In addition, we explored
what can be achieved by balancing the design through resampling strategies of up-sampling
(or over-sampling) the minority class and down-sampling (or under-sampling) the majority
class [KJ13] implemented through bootstrapping.
2.4 Implementation
We implemented our approach in a tool called maline, and Figure 2.2 shows its tool
ﬂow. The implementation comes as a free and open reproducible research environment to
foster further evaluation, development, and research in this area.4 Our experience working
on this project suggests that there is a lack of open, stable, and extensible infrastructures
for performing dynamic security analysis of Android. Hence, we have invested signiﬁcant
eﬀort into developing maline to be an extensive and reproducible research infrastructure
4The maline tool is available from https://github.com/soarlab/maline under the GNU Affero GPLv3
license.
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enabling execution of easy-to-repeat experiments in the wider domain of Android security.
maline heavily utilizes our own build of the Android Software Development Kit (SDK) and
in Section 2.4.1.1, we discuss speciﬁcs we introduced to the SDK. The SDK includes the
Android Emulator, which runs a virtual machine (VM) with the Android operating system.
Every application maline analyzes is installed, executed, and monitored in the VM. The
tool primarily resides on the host machine and relies on the Android Debug Bridge (adb)
to communicate with the VM. The bridge is used, for example, to push and install an
application from the host machine into the VM, to check the VM’s status, and to pull a log
ﬁle from the VM to the host machine.
Subsequently, maline generates feature vectors on the host machine and feeds them to
several machine learning libraries we used.
2.4.1 Host and Emulator
maline consists of a number of smaller components. We implemented multiple interfaces
on the host side, ranging from starting and monitoring an experiment with multiple emulator
instances running in parallel to machine-learning diﬀerences between applications based on
the processed data obtained from emulator instances. It is the host side that coordinates
and controls all such activities. For example, it creates and starts a pristine installation of
Android in an emulator instance, then installs an application in it, starts the application,
and waits for the application to ﬁnish so it can analyze system calls the application has
made during its execution.
We use the emulator, which is built on top of QEMU [Bel05], in the dynamic analysis
phase of our approach (see Figure 2.2). For every application, we create a pristine sandboxed
environment since the emulator enables us to easily create a clean installation of Android.
It is important that each application is executed in a clean and controlled environment to
make sure nothing is left behind from previous executions and to be able to monitor the
execution. Hence, every application’s execution is completely independent of executions of
all the other analyzed applications.
2.4.1.1 Custom Build of Android SDK
In our implementation, we used the Android 4.4.3 KitKat release, which utilizes Android
API version 19. However, we have our own build of the Android system implemented on
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top of the oﬃcial source code repositories. The main reason for the custom build is to avoid
bugs we found in the Android SDK throughout multiple releases.
For example, one release had a bug in the Android emulator, making it unable to boot
a virtual machine snapshot. Another release had a problem with the emulator sometimes
becoming unresponsive for hours.
Our build features a modiﬁcation to the Monkey tool (we describe the tool later) to have
better control over experiments. The default Monkey version injects an event into a system
queue and moves onto the next event right away, without waiting for the queued event to be
executed. However, to make Android more responsive, its developers decided to drop events
from the queue when under heavy load. In our experiments, this would mean that events
that Monkey injects might be discarded, thereby compromising the dynamic analysis of an
application under test. To make sure the Android system does not drop events, we have
slightly modiﬁed Monkey so that it waits for each event to be executed before proceeding
to the next event. We made this custom build freely available, and we reference it in the
maline documentation.
2.4.2 Automatic Testing of Applications
In order to scale to thousands of applications, our dynamic analysis phase implements
an automatic application testing and execution process. The process starts with making a
clean copy of our default VM. The copy contains only what is installed by default in a fresh
installation of the Android operating system from the Android Open Source Project. Once
the installation boots, we use adb to send an application from the host machine to the VM
for installation. Next, we start the application and immediately begin tracing system calls
related to the operating system process of the application with the strace tool. The system
calls are recorded into a log ﬁle.
We simulate a user interaction with an Android device by injecting both internal and
external events into the emulator. Internal events are sent to the application itself, such
as screen clicks, touches, and gestures. We use the Monkey tool [mon17] as our internal
event generator (see Figure 2.2). It sends a parameterized number of the events to the
application, with a 100 ms pause period between consecutive events if applicable.5 Unlike
5The pause between two consecutive events may not be applicable to actions that are time-dependent,
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internal events, which are delivered to the application, external events are delivered to the
emulator and include events that come from interacting with an external environment. In
our experiments, for external events, we focus on generating text messages and location
updates only since those are sometimes related to malicious behaviors.
We stop an application execution when all internal events generated by Monkey are
delivered and executed, and then we pull the log ﬁle from the VM to the host machine for
parsing. Next, we apply a feature vector representation, either the system call frequency
or dependency representation as explained in Section 2.3. The output is a textual feature
vector ﬁle per log ﬁle, i.e., per application, listing all the features. Finally, we combine all
the feature vectors into a single matrix where each matrix row corresponds to one feature
vector, i.e., one application.
2.4.3 Classification
Using the feature matrix generated from logs and previously obtained labels denoting
malware/goodware for applications, we proceed with classiﬁcation. As mentioned in Sec-
tion 2.3.3, we experimented with several classiﬁcation algorithms: random forest, SVMs,
LASSO, and ridge regression. An implementation of SVMs is based on libSVM [CL11],
while all the other algorithms are implemented in R [r17] using the language’s libraries. The
scripts are heavily parallelized and adjusted to be run on large machines or clusters. For
example, running a random forest model on a feature matrix from a system call dependency
graph sample requires 32 GB of RAM in one instance of ﬁve-fold cross-validation.
2.5 Experimental Evaluation
We evaluated maline using a set of 32-core machines with 128 GB of RAM running
Ubuntu 12.04. The machines are part of the Emulab infrastructure [WLS+02]. Our Android
virtual machines running on the computer had full Internet access during experiments. This
network conﬁguration enabled applications under analysis an almost unimpeded access to
whatever websites or resources they needed to access during their execution. Emulab does,
however, employ a ﬁrewall blocking most low numbered ports, which prevents a malicious
such as screen tapping. Furthermore, the pause is not to be confused with our modification to the SDK
regarding queued event execution.
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application from becoming a source of a DoS attack to sites outside of Emulab [emu15]. We
wrote scripts to automatize and parallelize our experiments, without which our extensive
experimental evaluation would not be possible. In our experiments, we use only the x86
Android emulator; the resulting x86 system call set S has 360 system calls.
As explained in Section 2.4.1.1, we have our own custom build of the Android SDK
version 4.4.3. Because the Android Open Source Project depends on more than four hundred
Git repositories, we needed to track the exact versions of the repositories used and the
changes we make on top of them. In the maline documentation, we record the exact
versions of each repository used in the custom build of the SDK.
2.5.1 Input Data Set
We obtained applications from Google Play as goodware. Our malware applications are
from the Drebin data set [ASH+14]. Before we could start using the collected applications
in maline, we performed a ﬁltering step. First, we removed applications that we failed
to consistently install in the Android emulator. For example, even though every Android
application is supposed to be self-contained, some applications had dependencies that were
not installed at the time; we do not include such applications in our ﬁnal data set. Second,
we removed all applications that we could not consistently start or that would crash imme-
diately. For example, unlike typical Android applications, application widgets are miniature
application views that do not have an Android Activity, and hence they cannot be started
from a launch menu. Third, with some applications, one of the ﬁrst two reasons was observed
only in some experiment setups. In order to have consistent data sets across all experiments,
we ﬁlter out such applications as well.
Applications in the Drebin data set were collected between August 2010 and October
2012, and ﬁltered by their collectors to contain only malicious applications. To the best of
our knowledge, this is the latest veriﬁed malware application collection of its size used
by researchers. The malicious applications come from more than 20 malware families
and are classiﬁed based on how an application is installed and activated, or based on
its malicious payloads [ZJ12]. The aim of our work is not to explore the speciﬁcs of the
families; many other researchers have done that. Therefore, in our experiments, we make no
distinction between malicious applications coming from diﬀerent families. Rather, our focus
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is on: 1) leveraging random automatic testing to generate input events for an application,
2) analyzing how stimulation in terms of events sent to an application and to the emulator
aﬀects the overall ability to discriminate benign from malicious applications, 3) comparing
feature vector models based on system calls, and 4) evaluating multiple machine learning
algorithms on the models. The Drebin data set contains 5560 malware applications; after
ﬁltering, our malicious data set contains 4289 of those applications.
We obtained the benign data set in February 2014 by utilizing a crawler tool. The tool
searched Google Play for free-of-charge applications in all usage categories (e.g., communica-
tion, education, music and audio, and business), and randomly collected applications with at
least 50,000 downloads. To get a good representation of the Google Play applications while
keeping the ratio of malware/goodware at the acceptable level for future classiﬁcation (see
Section 2.3.3), we decided to download roughly three times more goodware applications
than the number of obtained malware applications. We stopped our crawler at 12789
collected Google Play applications; after ﬁltering, our benign data set contains 8371 of
those applications. Note that we make an assumption that applications with more than
50,000 downloads are benign. The extent to which the assumption is reasonable has a direct
impact on the classiﬁcation results presented in this section. The list of all applications in
our input set is published in the maline repository.
2.5.2 Configurations
We explore the eﬀects of several parameters in our experiments, where one combination
of parameters represents a conﬁguration. The ﬁrst parameter is the number of events we
inject with Monkey into the emulator during an application execution. The number of events
is directly related to the length of the execution. We insert 1, 500, 1000, 2000, and 5000
events. It takes 229 seconds on average (with a standard deviation of 106 seconds) for an
application execution with 500 events and 823 (±816) seconds with 5000 events.6 That
includes the time needed to make a copy of a clean virtual machine, boot it, install the
application, run it, and download log ﬁles from the virtual machine to the host machine.
The second parameter is a ﬂag indicating if a benign background activity should be
6The standard deviations are relatively large compared to the averages because some applications crash
in the middle of their execution. We take recorded system call traces up to that point as their final execution
traces.
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present while executing the applications in the emulator. The activity consists of inserting
SMS text messages and location updates into the emulator as part of automatic testing. We
experiment with the activity only in the 500-Monkey-event experiments, while for all the
other experiments, we include no background activity.
It is important to ensure that consistent sequences of events are generated across the
executions of all applications. As Monkey generates pseudo-random events, we use the same
pseudo-random seed value in all experiments.
We made all data we obtained for diﬀerent conﬁgurations publicly available [DAUR16b].
2.5.3 Results
In this section, we give results of applying random automatic testing on Android appli-
cations with the goal of learning a binary classiﬁer that discriminates benign from malicious
applications. More precisely, we look at how the type and size of inputs generated by the
Monkey testing tool aﬀects the classiﬁer as seen through four quality measures. Finally, we
discuss trade oﬀs both in testing and machine learning that have several diﬀerent impacts
on the quality of the classiﬁer.
2.5.3.1 Number of System Calls
As a result of automatic testing by randomly generating and sending events to an
application and the Android operating system to drive the execution, numerous system calls
are invoked. The total number of system calls an application makes during its execution
directly impacts its feature vector, and potentially the amount of information it carries.
Hence, we identiﬁed the number of injected events, which directly inﬂuences the number
of system calls made, as an important metric to track. Figure 2.3 shows the number of
system calls observed per application in the dynamic analysis phase of an experiment. It
can be seen from the ﬁgure that the number of system calls observed per application in the
dynamic analysis phase of an experiment varies greatly. For example, in an experiment with
500 Monkey events, it ranges from 0 (for applications that failed to install and are ﬁltered
out) to over a million. Applications with no system calls are applications that failed to be
installed and they were not considered in later analyses. Most of the applications in this
































Figure 2.3. Number of system calls per application. The number is for one emulator
instance for an experiment with 500 Monkey events and the background activity.
2.5.3.2 Feature Matrices
After the dynamic analysis and feature extraction phases (see Section 2.3) on our ﬁltered
input set, maline generated 12 diﬀerent feature matrices. The matrices are based on
varying experiment conﬁgurations including: ﬁve event counts (1, 500, 1000, 2000, 5000),
two system call representations (frequency- and dependency-graph-based), and the inclusion
of an optional benign activity (SMS messages and location updates) for experiments with
500 events. We refer to these matrices with Xsizerep , where rep ∈ {freq , graph} is the used
representation of system calls and size is the number of generated events. In addition, we
denote an experiment with the benign background activity using an asterisk.
The obtained feature matrices generated according to the system call dependency rep-
resentation exhibited high sparsity. This is not surprising since the number of possible
system call pairs is 129600. Hence, all columns without a nonzero element were removed
from our matrices. Table 2.2 gives the dimensions of the obtained matrices and their level
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Table 2.2. Nonzero elements in reduced and full feature matrices. Zero-columns are
removed in the reduced matrices.
Full matrix Reduced matrix Full matrix Reduced matrix
Type non-zero (%) columns non-zero (%) Type non-zero (%) columns non-zero (%)
X
1
freq 12.48 118 38.09 X
1
graph 1.49 11112 17.42
X
500
freq∗ 17.30 137 45.48 X
500
graph∗ 3.01 15101 25.83
X
500
freq 17.27 138 45.07 X
500
graph 2.99 15170 25.61
X
1000
freq 17.65 136 46.72 X
1000
graph 3.12 15137 26.79
X
2000
freq 17.93 138 46.79 X
2000
graph 3.22 15299 27.34
X
5000
freq 18.15 136 48.04 X
5000
graph 3.29 15262 27.97
of sparsity. Both the frequency and dependency feature vector representations resulted in
diﬀerent nonzero elements in the feature matrices. However, those diﬀerences could have
only a small or no impact on the quality of classiﬁcation, i.e., it might be enough only
to observe if something happened, which could be encoded as zero/one values. Therefore,
we have created additional feature matrices by replacing all nonzero elements with ones to
measure the eﬀect of feature matrix structure on the classiﬁcation.
2.5.3.3 Cross-validated Comparison of Classifiers
Reduced feature matrices (just feature matrices from now on) and goodware/malware
labels are inputs to the classiﬁcation algorithms we used: support vector machines (SVMs),
random forest (RF), LASSO, and ridge regression. As described in Section 2.5.1, the Google
Play applications were marked as benign and the applications from the Drebin data set as
malicious. To avoid possible overﬁtting, we employed double ﬁve-fold cross-validation on
the set of applications to tune parameters and test models. To enable comparison between
diﬀerent classiﬁers for diﬀerent feature matrices, the same folds were used in the model
building among diﬀerent classiﬁcation models. Prior to building the ﬁnal model on the
whole training set, all classiﬁers were ﬁrst tuned by appropriate model selection techniques
to derive the best parameters. The SVMs algorithm in particular required an expensive
tuning phase: for each data set, we had to run ﬁve-fold cross-validation to ﬁnd the best
C and γ parameters. Hence, we had to run the training and testing phases with diﬀerent
values of C (ranging from 2−5 to 215) and γ (ranging from 2−15 to 23) for the ﬁve diﬀerent
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splits of training and testing sets. In the end, the best kernel to use with SVMs is the Radial
Basis Function (RBF) kernel.
The built classiﬁers were then validated on the appropriate test sets. If a positive example
(i.e., malware in our case) is classiﬁed into the positive (respectively, negative) group, we
obtained a true positive (respectively, false negative). Analogously, we deﬁne true negative
and false positive. The threshold for probabilistic classiﬁers was set at the usual level of
0.5. Since changes to this threshold can have an eﬀect on the sensitivity and the speciﬁcity
of classiﬁers, a usual representation of the eﬀect of these changes is given by ROC curves
(see Figure 2.4). Here we give ROC curves only for the random forest models (as the best
classiﬁers judging from the cross-validated comparison) with the largest number of events
(5000).
Figure 2.5 shows measures of the quality of prediction (see Table 2.1) averaged between
cross-validation folds for diﬀerent classiﬁers. As it can be seen from the ﬁgure, one-event
quality measures are consistently the worst in each category, often with a large margin.
In other words, the size of input to automatic random testing impacts the quality of
resulting classiﬁers. This indicates the importance of leveraging the information gathered
while driving an application using random events. Moreover, the random forest algorithm































Figure 2.4. ROC curves for ﬁve-fold cross-validation with RF model. The curves are for









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2.5. Quality comparison of classiﬁers. All values are averaged on ﬁve cross-valida-
tion folds. Values on the vertical axis represent percentages. Labels on the horizontal axis
are written in the short form where wo stands for without background, with stands for with
background, f stands for freq, g stands for graph, o at the end denotes that 0-1 matrices were
used, and the numbers at the beginning represent numbers of generated events. 1-event
experiments have a 2.3% smaller set of applications.
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cases where feature matrices have weights instead of zeros and ones, it shows only small
variations across all the input parameters. Other classiﬁcation algorithms perform better
on the dependency than on the frequency representation. Of the other algorithms, SVM is
most aﬀected by the presence of the background activity, giving worse sensitivity with the
presence, but on the other hand, giving better speciﬁcity.
When the weights in the feature matrices are replaced with zeros and ones, thereby
focusing on the structure of the features and not their values, all the algorithms consistently
perform better on the dependency than on the frequency feature vector representation.
However, a comparison within an algorithm based on the weights or zeros and ones in the
feature matrices is not straightforward. Random forest clearly performs worse when zeros
and ones are used in the feature matrices. LASSO and ridge typically perform better in all
the quality measures apart from sensitivity for the zeros and ones compared to the weights.
If a domain expert in Android malware detection is considering to apply maline in
practice, there are several practical lessons to be learned from Figure 2.5. The expert can
choose to use only the random forest algorithm as it consistently provides the best outcomes
across all the quality measures. To reduce the time needed to dynamically analyze an
application, it suﬃces to provide 500 Monkey events as an application execution driver.
Furthermore, the presence of the benign background activity does not make much of a
diﬀerence. On the other hand, to provide few execution-driving events to an application
does not suﬃce. Finally, if the time needed to learn a classiﬁer is crucial and more important
than sensitivity, the expert can choose the frequency feature vector representation since it
yields almost as good results as the dependency representation, but with far smaller feature
vectors.
Figure 2.4 shows that there is not much variability between ﬁve diﬀerent folds from the
cross-validation of the best-performing algorithm, namely random forest. This indicates a
high stability of the random forest model on the input data set regardless of the choice of
training and test sets. It is up to the domain expert to make the trade-oﬀ choice in tuning
a classiﬁer towards either high sensitivity or speciﬁcity. The choice is directly related to the
cost of having false positives, the beneﬁts of having more true positives, etc. For example,
the domain expert may choose the dependency graph feature vector representation and ﬁx
the desired speciﬁcity level to 95%; from the graph ROC curve in Figure 2.4, it follows that
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the sensitivity level would be around 93%.
2.5.3.4 Exploring the Effect of Matrix Sparsity
Sparsity of feature matrices can sometimes lead to overﬁtting. Although we signiﬁcantly
reduce the sparsity with the removal of columns with all zeros, this just removes non-
informative features and sparsity is still relatively high (25% for graph representations).
To be sure that the eﬀect seen in the cross-validation comparison is real, we performed
additional exploration by adopting the idea of permutation tests [OG10].
Due to prohibitively high computational costs, we used only one classiﬁcation model
to explore the eﬀect of sparsity. We chose the random forest classiﬁer, since it gave the
best results on the cross-validation comparison and the 5000-event matrices. Prior to
building a classiﬁer, we permuted application labels. As before, in this exploration of matrix
sparsity, we applied ﬁve-fold cross-validation on permuted labels, thus obtaining quality of
prediction on the permuted sample. This procedure was repeated 1000 times. Average
accuracies of the obtained classiﬁers were compared to the accuracy of the RF model from
Figure 2.5 and they were all signiﬁcantly lower: the best was at 83% for the system call
dependency representation. Although 1000 simulations is not much in permutation models,
this exploration reduced the probability of accidentally obtaining high-quality results just
because of sparsity.
2.5.3.5 Exploring the Effect of Unbalanced Design
Since the number of malware applications in our input set is half the number of goodware,
we have an unbalanced design. Hence, we employed down/up-sampling through bootstrap-
ping to explore if we could get better results using balanced designs (i.e., where the number
of malware and goodware applications is the same). Here, we used only the RF classiﬁer to
keep computational costs feasible.
Up- and down-sampling exhibited the same eﬀect on the quality of prediction for all
feature matrices: it increased sensitivity at the cost of decreased speciﬁcity. This comes as
no surprise since we have equated the number of malware and goodware applications, thereby
giving larger weights to malware applications in the model built compared to the situation
before. However, the overall accuracy for models with down-sampling was lower than for
the unbalanced model, while for models with up-sampling, it was higher (up to 96.5% for
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accuracy with a 98% sensitivity and 95% speciﬁcity). To explore the stability of results under
down- and up-sampling, these methods were repeated 10 times. The standard deviation of
accuracies between repeats (on the percentage scale) was 0.302. For a comparison of random
forest classiﬁers with up- and down-sampling, consult Figure 2.6. The ﬁgure provides a
comparison of random forest classiﬁers with up- and down-sampling, while Figure 2.7 shows
ROC curves for a random forest classiﬁer with up-sampling.
2.5.3.6 Exploring the Effect of Inputs in Testing
As explained in Section 2.3.1, in the dynamic analysis phase of the approach, we use
random automatic testing to drive application execution. In general, the type and size
of inputs in automatic testing aﬀects the outcome in testing, or in our case, the observed
behavior of applications under test. The generated and used inputs in testing have a direct
inﬂuence on the system calls that happen between an application and the Android operating
system, which in turn reﬂects on feature vectors for machine learning, and ﬁnally on the
overall quality of binary classiﬁers for malware detection. The type and size of inputs that
we used in evaluating our malware detectors is explained in Section 2.5.2.
Based on the results for four quality measures of machine learning binary classiﬁers as
given in Section 2.5.3.3, we can observe the following with regard to the eﬀect of the type
and size of inputs for random automatic testing on the overall quality of malware detection
rates. For background activity, which we included only in the case of conﬁgurations with
500 Monkey events in order to keep the computation time tractable, there was almost no
inﬂuence on the quality of the classiﬁers except for those built with the SVMs algorithm.
This background activity, which comprises text messages and location updates, is therefore
much less important than internal events generated by Monkey.
When it comes to the size of inputs, i.e., the number of pseudo-random events that
Monkey generated and fed to an application under test, we show that, for example, one
event only is not suﬃcient to build high-quality classiﬁers. On the other hand, the overall
quality of built classiﬁers varies little as we vary the number of Monkey events between
500 and 5000 (see Figure 2.5 and Figure 2.6). This suggests that there is a threshold in
terms of the number of Monkey-generated events for learning the behavior of applications.
Finally, these insights can provide guidance to malware detection experts in conﬁguring their
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Figure 2.6. Quality comparison of classiﬁers with up- and down-sampling. All values are
averaged on 5 cross-validation folds. Labels on the x axis are written in the short form
where wo stands for without background, with stands for with background, f stands for freq,
g stands for graph, o at the end denotes that 0-1 matrices were used, and the numbers
at the beginning represent number of events used. In the names of classiﬁers, -u denotes
































Figure 2.7. ROC curves for ﬁve-fold cross-validation with RF model and up-sampling. The
curves are for the X5000freq and X
5000
graph feature matrices with up-sampling.
malware detection systems.
2.5.4 Used Computational Resources
Here we present the scale of used computational resources needed to carry out as thorough
and extensive experiments as demonstrated in this chapter. It can be seen that a lot of
resources had to be allocated toward such experiments to be able to draw strong conclusions
about our approach to malware detection. We employed up to nine 32-core (with hyper-
threading up to 64 threads) 128 GB RAM Emulab testbed machines in parallel to reduce
the wall-clock time needed to perform the experiments. Not all tasks were executed under
the same load, thereby utilizing the available resources to diﬀerent extents at diﬀerent stages
of the evaluation. We also report memory and disk usage.
The dynamic analysis and feature extraction phases together took around 12 days,
typically using over 100 GB of RAM. Executing them on a single-core machine with the same
CPU clock speed would have taken about a year. All machine learning techniques, including
their training, testing, and evaluation, took around six days; without the parallelization, it
would have been more than ﬁve years. Simulations for permuted labels took six days to
ﬁnish and they would have taken almost three years if executed on the single-core machine.
To sum up, the total single-core CPU time for all the experiments is approximately nine
years, while by heavily parallelizing our experiments, we managed to ﬁnish them in less than
32
a month.
The classiﬁers, including cross-validation, took about ﬁve days, which would have been
about 50 days. The longest part were the simulations based on permutations.
The ﬁrst intensive part was running Android emulators and performing the dynamic
analysis of applications executing in the emulators. Each virtual machine in an emulator
instance would require more than 3 GB of memory to run. Because we had 128 GB RAM
computers at hand, we determined 30 instances of Android emulators can execute in parallel
on a single testbed computer. Typical usage would be over 100 GB of memory at a given
moment. If parallelization had not been employed, it would have taken almost one year of
sequential execution on a single computer to analyze applications according to 10 execution
combinations of input parameters.
Building a random forest classiﬁer (as described in Section 2.5.3.3) for representation with
the system call dependency graph takes around half an hour on 48 cores while for frequency
representation, it takes around two minutes. In total, that makes around 48×(2×5+30×5) =
7680 minutes or ﬁve days and eight hours of CPU time (if one core is used). Using down-
sampling takes about 20% less time than for the full model while up-sampling takes around
50% more time. Therefore, if classiﬁers were to be built on only one core, it would take
around 10 days for the cross-validated build of random forest models.
Simulations based on permutations do the same calculations (in permuted labels) as
the cross-validated random forest so it takes around the same time to ﬁnish. Since we did
1000 simulations, using the average times from the previous paragraph, the duration of the
calculations were around 1000× 48× (30 + 2) = 1, 536, 000 minutes or around 2.9 years of
CPU time (if one core is used).
Ridge regression took around one hour per ﬁve-fold cross-validation on 48 cores while
LASSO regression took around 20 minutes. Building random forest, LASSO and ridge
classiﬁers took around ﬁve hours, and it would have taken 29 days if executed sequentially
on the single-core computer.
The heaviest part of running the SVMs classiﬁcation against the ﬁve diﬀerent data sets
was the parameters selection. Given the resources availability, for each data set, we could
run 64 instances of training and ﬁnd the best parameters in a reasonable amount of time.
It took 20 hours to analyze each one of the ﬁve data sets containing data about the system
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calls frequency and 40 hours to analyze the same number of data sets with the dependency
calls graph data. Since we ran the experiments in ﬁve diﬀerent machines, the total time
was about 60 hours. If we did not have the opportunity to parallelize the experiments using
diﬀerent machines and several cores, running all the experiments sequentially, it would have
taken a total of about 600 hours, which would be 25 days of uninterrupted computation.
The total disk usage is also signiﬁcant. The Android SDK sources, analyzed applications,
and generated data during the analyses resulted in 5 TB of disk usage in total.
2.6 Related Work
There is a large body of research on malware detection in contexts other than An-
droid (e.g., [PBCK13, FJC+10, RTWH11, ZJS+11, LBK+10, CAM+08, PMRB09, KCK+09,
SDTC+16, JAS14]). While our work was originally inspired by some of these approaches, we
primarily focus in this section on more closely related work on Android malware detection.
Ever since Android has become popular, there has been an increasing body of research on
detecting malicious Android applications, and we split that research into static and dynamic
analysis techniques.
2.6.1 Static Techniques
Static techniques are typically based on source code or binary analyses that search for
malicious patterns (e.g., [FADA14, WROR14]). For example, static approaches include
analyzing permission requests for application installation [ADY13, GTGZ14, FHE+12],
control ﬂow [LKM+13, LSM14], signature-based detection [GZZ+12, FADA14], and static
taint-analysis [ARF+14].
Stowaway [FCH+11] is a tool that detects over-privilege requests during the applica-
tion install time. Enck et al. [EOMC11] study popular applications by decompiling them
back into their source code and then searching for unsafe coding security issues. Yang et
al. [YXA+15] propose AppContext, a static program analysis approach to classify benign
and malicious applications. AppContext classiﬁes applications using machine learning based
on the contexts that trigger security-sensitive behaviors. It builds a call graph from an
application binary and after diﬀerent transformations, it extracts the context factors via
information ﬂow analysis. It is then able to obtain the features for the machine learning
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algorithms from the extracted context. In the paper, 202 malicious and 633 benign ap-
plications from the Google Play store are analyzed. AppContext correctly identiﬁes 192
malicious applications with an 87.7% accuracy. Gascon et al. [GYAR13] also use call graphs
to detect malware. Once they extract function call graphs from Android applications, they
apply a linear-time graph kernel in order to map call graphs to features. These features are
given as input to SVMs to distinguish between benign and malicious applications. They
conducted experiments on 135,792 benign and 12,158 malware applications, detecting 89%
of the malware with a 1% false positive rate.
2.6.2 Dynamic Techniques
Dynamic analysis techniques consist of running applications in a sandbox environment or
on real devices in order to gather information about the application behavior. Dynamic taint
analysis [EGC+10, YY12] and behavior-based detection [DMSS12, BZNT11] are examples of
dynamic approaches. Our approach analyzes Android applications dynamically and captures
their behavior based on the execution pattern of system calls. Some existing works follow
similar approaches.
Dini et al. [DMSS12] propose a framework MADAM for Android malware detection,
which monitors applications at the kernel and user level. MADAM detects system calls
at the kernel level and user activity/idleness at the user level to capture the application
behavior. Their extremely preliminary and limited results, considering only 50 goodware and
two malware applications, show a 100% detection accuracy. Crowdroid [BZNT11] is another
behavior-based Android malware detector that uses system calls and machine learning. As
opposed to our approach, Crowdroid collects information about system calls through a
community of users. A lightweight application, installed in the users’ devices, monitors the
system calls (frequency) of running applications and sends them to a centralized server,
which performs classiﬁcation. Crowdroid was evaluated on a limited number of goodware
applications and only two malware applications, obtaining detection accuracies of 100% for
one and 85% for the other.
Rieck et al. [RTWH11] propose another framework for automatic Windows malware de-
tection that leverages applications behavior and machine learning. The proposed framework
analyzes each application and maps its monitored behavior (through system call tracing)
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to feature vectors that can be used in both clustering and classiﬁcation techniques. The
framework groups system calls based on their functionality, thereby forming a hierarchical
structure for their feature vector representation. By alternating clustering and classiﬁcation,
the framework can incrementally analyze thousands of applications on a daily basis and
identify novel and known classes of malware. Known malware classes are identiﬁed ﬁrst.
Then, the obtained information about known malware classes combined with unidentiﬁed
application behavior reports is clustered for discovery of new malware classes. Their exper-
imental results show an F-measure of 96%, while our computed F-measure is 91%.
2.7 Threats to Validity
There are multiple ways in which validity of this work could be compromised. We address
them here.
2.7.1 Application Crashes
We observed applications crashing while performing our experiments, which could bias
our empirical results. This might impact conclusions we draw about what kind of behavior
is learned with machine learning. In particular, it could be that one behavior group crashes
more often; hence, we would be learning to discriminate a more-crashing from a less-crashing
group of applications, and not goodware from malware. A crash in general happens due to
an application ending up in a program state not foreseen by its developer, resulting in a
non-regular application termination. We used the Monkey tool in the experiments to drive
applications in their executions. Given that Monkey generates sequences of pseudo-random
input events, it is to be expected that it can drive an application into a state that does not
handle certain kinds of events, causing a crash. Depending on an experiment, we observed
from 29% to 49% applications crash, which could bias our empirical results. However, the
crash rate of goodware and malware applications is roughly the same. Therefore, application
crashes do not bring in a classiﬁcation bias.
2.7.2 Age of Applications
Our goodware data set comprises applications downloaded in 2014, while our malware
applications are from 2010 – 2012. Because the Android operating system’s API evolved
from 2010 to 2014, it could mean our approach learns diﬀerences between APIs, and not
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diﬀerences between benign and malicious behaviors. Unfortunately, we could not obtain
older versions of applications from Google Play as it hosts only the most recent versions.
In addition, to the best of our knowledge, a more recent malware data set does not exist.
Hence, we manually downloaded 2010 – 2012 releases of 92 applications from F-Droid [fdr15],
an Android application repository oﬀering multiple releases of free software applications; we
assumed the applications to be benign. We classiﬁed them using maline, and we obtained
speciﬁcity of around 88%. Compared to the speciﬁcities from Figure 2.5, which were typically
around 96%, this might indicate that maline performs API diﬀerence learning to some
extent. However, a comparison with a much bigger set of the same applications across
diﬀerent releases would need to be performed to draw strong conclusions. This suggests that
the diﬀerence in age of applications used in our experiments does not create a considerable
bias.
2.7.3 Hidden Malicious Behavior
Malicious behavior may occasionally be hidden and triggered only under very speciﬁc
circumstances. As our approach is based on random testing, we might miss such hard-to-
reach behaviors, which could aﬀect our ability to detect such application as malicious. Such
malware is not common though, and ultimately, we consistently obtain sensitivity of 87%
and more using maline.
2.7.4 Detecting Emulation
As noted in previous work [JZAH14, PMRB09, CAM+08], malware could potentially
detect it is running in an emulator and alter its behavior accordingly. maline does not
address this issue directly. However, an application trying to detect that it is being executed
in an emulator triggers numerous system calls, which likely leaves a speciﬁc signature that
can be detected by maline. We consistently obtain sensitivity of 87% and more using
maline. If we are to assume that all the remaining malware went undetected only due
to its capability of detecting the emulator and consequently changing its behavior without
leaving the system call signature, it is at most 13% of the malware in our experiments that
successfully disguise as goodware. Finally, Chen et al. [CAM+08] show that less than 4% of
the malware in their experiments changes its behavior in a virtualized environment.
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2.7.5 System Architecture and Native Code
While the majority of Android-powered devices are ARM-based, maline uses an x86-
based Android emulator for performance reasons. Few Android applications — less than 5%
according to Zhou et al. [ZWZJ12] — contain native libraries typically compiled for multiple
platforms, including x86, and hence they can be executed with maline. Nonetheless,
the ARM and x86 system architectures have diﬀerent system calls: with the x86-based
and ARM-based emulator, we observed applications utilizing 360 and 209 diﬀerent system
calls, respectively. Our initial implementation of maline was ARM-based, and switching to
an x86-based implementation yielded roughly the same classiﬁcation results in preliminary
experiments, while it greatly improved performance.
2.7.6 Randomness in maline
In maline we used only one seed value for Monkey’s pseudo-random number generator; it
is possible the outcome of our experiments would have been diﬀerent if another seed value was
used. However, as the seed value has to be used consistently within an experiment consisting
of thousands of applications, it is highly unlikely the diﬀerence would be signiﬁcant.
2.8 Conclusions
In this chapter, we presented a free software reproducible research environment maline
for dynamic-analysis-based malware detection in Android. Our approach is based on lever-
aging random automatic testing to generate events that drive an application execution in
Android, observing system calls that occur during the execution, encoding the system calls
into features for machine learning, and ﬁnally building binary classiﬁers that discriminate
benign from malicious applications. We presented an extensive empirical evaluation of
our novel system call encoding into a feature vector representation against a well-known
frequency representation across several dimensions. The novel encoding shows better quality
than the frequency representation. Our evaluation provides numerous insights into the
structure of application executions, the impact of diﬀerent machine learning techniques, and
the type and size of inputs to automatic testing in dynamic analyses, serving as a guide for
future research. To facilitate further and reproducible research, we made our data freely
available.
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In this work, we showed how the type and size of inputs in automatic testing aﬀect the
quality measures of built binary classiﬁers. Background activity such as text messages and
location updates usually have negligible inﬂuence, except for classiﬁers built with the SVMs
algorithm. Therefore, for almost all classiﬁers, internal events sent directly to applications
under test had the deﬁning impact. In terms of the size of inputs, very few inputs are not
enough to build good classiﬁers. However, the diﬀerence in the quality measures between
a few hundred and a few thousand random events in automatic testing is very small. This
shows that eﬃcient malware detection can be achieved with a relatively short amount of
time spent in automatic random testing of applications under consideration.
CHAPTER 3
AUTOMATIC TESTING FOR OBJECT-
ORIENTED SOFTWARE
This chapter is based on several publications [Dim13, DGH+14, DR13, LDG+16].1
3.1 Introduction
Software developers heavily rely on testing for improving the quality of their software.
There are good reasons for adopting this practice. First, as opposed to more heavyweight
techniques such as static analysis, testing is easy to deploy and understand, and most
developers are familiar with software testing processes and tools. Second, testing is scalable
(i.e., millions of tests can be executed within hours even on large programs) and precise (i.e.,
it does not generate false alarms that impede developers’ productivity). Third, while testing
cannot prove the absence of bugs, there is ample evidence that testing does ﬁnd important
bugs that are ﬁxed by developers. Despite these advantages, testing is not a silver bullet
since crafting good tests is a time-consuming and costly process, and even then, achieving
high coverage and catching all defects using testing can be challenging. Naturally, there has
been a great deal of research on alleviating these problems by developing techniques that
aim to improve the automation and eﬀectiveness (in terms of achieved coverage and defects
found) of software testing.
Random testing is the most basic and straightforward approach to automating software
testing. Typically, it completely automatically generates and executes millions of test cases
within hours, and quickly covers many statements/branches of the software under test
(SUT). However, a drawback of random testing is that, depending on the characteristics
of the SUT, the achieved coverage plateaus due to unlikely execution paths. Figure 3.1 gives
our motivating example Java program that illustrates this point. To apply random testing
1Portions of the published work are reused and reprinted here with permission.
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public class Absolute {
private int x;
public Absolute(int x) {
this.x = x;
}
public int difference(int y) {
int out;
if (x > y) out = x - y;
else out = y - x;
assert out > 0;
return out;
}
@Test public void testAbsolute() {




Figure 3.1. Example Java program for computing absolute diﬀerence. It consists of class
Absolute and its method difference that computes the absolute diﬀerence between ﬁeld
x and input parameter y. It also checks whether the computed diﬀerence is greater than 0.
In addition, we include a simple unit test for this class and method.
on the example, we generate the following randomized unit test:
public void testAbsolute() {
Absolute abs = new Absolute(random());
abs.difference(random());
}
Clearly, it is trivial to execute this simple unit test many times, each time with a new
pair of random numbers being generated. It is unlikely, however, that executing it would
generate inputs that violate the assertion swiftly since that requires for the two inputs to
be equal; moreover, the achieved code coverage would plateau. A quick analysis of the
code reveals that covering the assertion amounts to solving a simple logical constraint over
inputs of the form X ≤ Y ∧ Y − X ≤ 0 (see Section 3.2.1). This observation is the basis
for dynamic symbolic execution, which leverages automatic constraint solvers to compute
test inputs that cover such hard-to-cover branches. For example, the JDart [LDG+16]
dynamic symbolic execution tool when run on method testAbsolute generates test cases
covering all branches in less than a second, thereby triggering an assertion violation. A
paper on JDart [LDG+16] also shows that the tool improves coverage over random testing
for a class of numerically intensive SUTs. In general, symbolic testing-based methods excel
in automatically generating test inputs over primitive numeric data types, and have hence
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been successfully applied as either system-level (e.g., SAGE [GLM12], KLEE [CDE08]) or
method-level (e.g., JDart [LDG+16], JCute [SA06]) test generators.
Generating unit tests for object-oriented software poses an additional challenge: instead
of taking just primitive types as input, methods in object-oriented software require a rich
heap structure of class objects to be generated. We can observe this even in the simple
unit test given in Figure 3.1. Here, testing of method difference requires an object of
type Absolute to be ﬁrst created and initialized, and in turn, difference is invoked on it.
While several approaches have been proposed that automatically generate symbolic heap
structures [KPV03], logical encoding of such structures results in more complex constraints
that put an additional burden on constraint solvers; hence, these approaches have not yet
seen wider adoption on large SUTs. On the other hand, generating heap structures by
randomly creating sequences of constructor+method invocations was shown to be eﬀective,
in particular when advanced search- and feedback-directed algorithms are employed (e.g.,
EvoSuite [FA11], Randoop [PLEB07]). It is then natural to attempt to combine the two
approaches by using random testing to perform global/macro exploration (by generating
heap structures using sequences of constructor+method invocations at the level of classes)
and dynamic symbolic execution to perform local/micro exploration (by generating inputs
of primitive types using constraint solvers at the level of methods). In this chapter, we
describe, implement, and empirically evaluate such a hybrid approach.
Our hybrid approach combines feedback-directed unit testing with dynamic symbolic
execution. We leverage feedback-directed unit testing to generate method sequences that
create heap structures and drive a SUT into interesting global (i.e., macro) states. We
feed the generated sequences to a dynamic symbolic execution engine to compute inputs of
primitive types that drive the SUT into interesting local (i.e., micro) states. We implemented
this approach in a tool named JDoop, which combines the feedback-directed unit testing
tool Randoop [PLEB07] with our dynamic symbolic execution engine JDart [LDG+16].
Given that such a combination has not been thoroughly empirically studied in the past, we
also assess the merits of this approach through a large-scale empirical evaluation.
Our main contributions are as follows:
• We developed JDoop, a hybrid tool that combines feedback-directed unit testing
with dynamic symbolic execution to be able to experiment with large-scale automatic
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testing of object-oriented software.
• We implemented a distributed benchmarking infrastructure for running experiments
in isolation on a cluster of machines. This allows us to execute large-scale experiments
that ensure statistical signiﬁcance, and also advances the reproducibility of our results.
• We performed an extensive empirical evaluation and comparison between random (our
baseline) and hybrid testing approaches in the context of automatic testing of object-
oriented software.
• We identiﬁed several open research questions during our evaluation, performed ad-
ditional targeted experiments to obtain answers to these questions, and provided
guidelines for future research eﬀorts in this area.
3.2 Preliminaries
In this section, we introduce dynamic symbolic execution, feedback-directed random
testing, and explain how in particular we implemented dynamic symbolic execution in a
modular testing framework called JDart.
3.2.1 Dynamic Symbolic Execution
Dynamic symbolic execution [GKS05, SMA05, CDE08] is a program analysis technique
that executes a program with concrete and symbolic inputs at the same time. It systemati-
cally collects constraints over the symbolic program inputs as it is exploring program paths,
thereby representing program behaviors as algebraic expressions over symbolic values. The
program eﬀects can thus be expressed as a function of such expressions.
Dynamic symbolic execution maintains, in addition to the concrete state deﬁned by
the concrete program semantics, the symbolic state, which is a tuple containing symbolic
values of program variables, a path condition, and a program counter. A path condition
is a conjunction of symbolic expressions over the symbolic inputs that characterizes an
execution path through the program. It is generated by accumulating (symbolic) conditions
encountered along the execution path, so that concrete data values that satisfy it can be
used to drive its concrete execution. Such values are typically computed using automatic
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constraint solvers. Path conditions are stored as a symbolic execution tree that characterizes
all the paths exercised as part of the symbolic analysis.
In dynamic symbolic execution, the symbolic execution tree is built by repeatedly aug-
menting it with new paths that are obtained from unexplored branches in the tree. This
is done by employing an exploration strategy such as depth-ﬁrst, breadth-ﬁrst, or random.
A constraint solver is used to obtain a valuation for a yet-unexplored branch by feeding
it the corresponding path condition. The new valuation drives a new iteration of dynamic
symbolic execution that augments the symbolic execution tree with a new path.
Figure 3.1 gives a simple Java program that we use to illustrate how dynamic symbolic
execution works. Note that the provided unit test does not fail when executed. However,
the assertion can in fact be violated when x and y are equal, and we describe next how
dynamic symbolic execution generates such inputs. First, we treat ﬁeld x and parameter y
as symbolic inputs. Their values, as well as all decisions involving them, are recorded during
execution as symbolic constraints. We use X and Y to represent the symbolic inputs. The
resulting symbolic execution tree is shown in Figure 3.2.
In the initial state, the path condition PC is True. The algorithm then proceeds with the
ﬁrst concrete execution that uses the initial provided concrete inputs x = 10 and y = 0. The
if-condition in method difference involves symbolic values that are recorded in the path
condition. Since x > y and variable out = 10, the assertion in the unit test is not violated
x : X, y : Y
PC : True
x : X, y : Y
PC : X > Y
x : X, y : Y
OUT : X − Y
PC : X > Y
x : X, y : Y
OUT : X − Y
PC : X > Y
∧X − Y > 0
Path 1 (OK)
X − Y > 0
x : X, y : Y
OUT : X − Y
PC : X > Y
∧X − Y ≤ 0
UNSAT
X − Y ≤ 0
X > Y
x : X, y : Y
PC : X ≤ Y
x : X, y : Y
OUT : Y −X
PC : X ≤ Y
x : X, y : Y
OUT : Y −X
PC : X ≤ Y
∧ Y −X > 0
Path 2 (OK)
Y −X > 0
x : X, y : Y
OUT : Y −X
PC : X ≤ Y
∧ Y −X ≤ 0
Path 3 (ERROR)
Y −X ≤ 0
X ≤ Y
Figure 3.2. Symbolic execution for program in Figure 3.1. The tree characterizes the paths
exercised by dynamic symbolic execution of the example program.
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and its condition is similarly recorded in the path condition. Then, the execution terminates
(Path 1). To drive the next iteration, the algorithm uses a constraint solver to try to compute
concrete values for exploring a yet-unexplored branch: the false branch of the condition in
the assertion. This path is represented by the path condition X > Y ∧X − Y ≤ 0, which is
unsatisﬁable, and hence this path is not feasible.
The algorithm moves to the next unexplored branch: the false branch of the if-condition
with path conditionX ≤ Y . Let us assume that a solver will return the satisfying assignment
x = 5 and y = 10. A new iteration of dynamic symbolic execution is driven by these
concrete values, resulting in Path 2 being exercised (still no assertion violation). The ﬁnal
unexplored branch is the false branch of the condition in the assertion represented by the
path condition X ≤ Y ∧ Y −X ≤ 0. Indeed this constraint is satisﬁable whenever X = Y ,
which leads to an assertion violation. Since there are no other unexplored branches left in
the symbolic execution tree, the algorithm terminates.
3.2.2 Feedback-directed Random Testing
A simple approach to automatic unit testing of object-oriented software is to completely
randomly generate sequences of constructor+method invocations together with the respec-
tive concrete input values. However, this typically results in a large overhead since numerous
sequences get generated with invalid preﬁxes that lead to violations of common implicit class
or method requirements (e.g., passing a null reference to a method that expects an allocated
object). Moreover, such sequences cause trivial, uninteresting exceptions to be thrown early,
thereby preventing deep exploration of the SUT state space. Hence, instead of generating
unit tests blindly and in a completely random fashion, useful feedback can be gathered from
previous test executions to direct the creation of new unit tests. In this way, unit tests
that execute long sequences of method calls to completion (i.e., without exceptions being
thrown) can be generated. This approach is known as feedback-directed random testing and
is implemented in the Randoop automatic unit testing tool [PLEB07].
Randoop uses information from previous test executions to direct further unit test
generation. The tool maintains two sets of constructor+method invocation sequences: those
that do not violate a property (i.e., property-preserving) and those that do (i.e., property-
violating). The property-violating set is initially empty, while the property-preserving set
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is initialized with an empty sequence. The default property that is maintained is unit test
termination without any errors or exceptions being thrown. Randoop randomly selects
a public method (or a constructor) and an existing sequence from the property-preserving
set. It then appends the invocation of the selected constructor/method to the end of the
sequence, and replaces primitive type arguments with concrete values that are randomly
selected from a preset pool of values. Next, the newly generated sequences are compared
against all previously generated sequences in the two sets. If it already exists, it is simply
dropped and random selection is repeated. Otherwise, Randoop executes the new sequence
and checks for property violations. If no properties are violated, the sequence is added to
the property-preserving set and otherwise to the property-violating set. Randoop keeps on
extending property-preserving sequences until it reaches a provided time limit.
3.2.3 JDart
JDart [LDG+16] is a modular testing framework for Java bytecode. The development
of JDart has been driven by two main goals. The primary goal has been to build a symbolic
analysis framework that is robust enough to handle large-scale software. More precisely, it
has to be able to execute such software without crashing, deal with long execution paths,
and deal with complex path constraints. The second objective has been to build a modular
and extensible platform that can be used for the implementation and evaluation of novel
ideas in dynamic symbolic execution. For example, JDart is designed to allow for easy
replacement of all of its components: it supports diﬀerent and combined constraint solvers,
and several exploration strategies and termination criteria.
A run of JDart produces the following outputs: a symbolic execution tree that contains
all explored paths along with performance statistics, vectors of concrete input values that
execute paths in the tree, and a suite of test cases (based on these vectors). A symbolic
execution tree contains leaf nodes for all explored paths (similar to the one shown in
Figure 3.2) and additionally leaves for branches oﬀ of executed paths that could not be
explored because the constraint solver was not able to produce adequate concrete values or
because native code is not executed in the fully symbolic mode (JDart’s ability to handle
native code is described later in Section 3.2.3.5). For these leaves, JDart does not generate
input vectors or test cases.
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This section presents the modular architecture of JDart, and discusses its main compo-
nents and extension points. It subsequently describes existing uses of JDart as a component
within other research tools.
3.2.3.1 Architecture
JDart executes Java bytecode programs and performs a dynamic symbolic analysis of
speciﬁc methods in these programs. JDart also implements extensions that build upon the
results of a dynamic symbolic analysis:
• the Method Summarizer generates fully abstract method summaries for analyzed
methods [HGR13]. In the generated summaries, class members, input parameters,
and return values are represented symbolically.
• the Test Suite Generator generates JUnit test suites that exercise all the program
paths found by JDart.
During dynamic symbolic analysis, JDart uses two main components to iteratively
execute the target method, to record and explore symbolic constraints, and to ﬁnd new
concrete data values for new executions. Figure 3.3 depicts the modular architecture of
JDart. The basis (at the bottom) is the Executor that executes the analyzed program
and records symbolic constraints on data values. The Explorer organizes recorded path
constraints into a constraints tree, and decides which paths to explore next, and when to stop
exploration. The Explorer uses the JConstraints library to integrate diﬀerent constraint
solvers that can be used in ﬁnding concrete data values for symbolic paths constraints.
3.2.3.2 Executor
The Executor runs a target program and executes an analyzed method with diﬀerent
concrete data values for method parameters and class members. It also records symbolic
constraints for program paths. Currently, JDart uses the software model checker Java
PathFinder (JPF) for the execution of Java bytecode programs. JDart uses two extension
points of JPF.
JPF uses “choice generators” to mark points in an execution to which JPF backtracks
during state-space exploration. JDart implements a choice generator that sets parameter
values of methods that are analyzed symbolically.
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Figure 3.3. Architecture of JDart.
JPF extensions can provide custom bytecode implementations. JDart adds a concolic
semantics to Java bytecodes that performs concrete and symbolic operations simultaneously,
while also recording path constraints. Using JPF as an execution platform has several
beneﬁts. For example, it is easy to integrate other JPF extensions in JDart (e.g., for
dealing with native code or for recording test coverage). Moreover, JPF provides easy
access to all objects on the heap and stack, as well as to many other elements and facilities
of the JVM such as stack frames and class loading.
On the other hand, using a full-blown custom JVM for execution has an impact on
performance. This is one of the reasons why we keep the integration with JPF as loose as
possible. JDart has been built with the possibility of changing the underlying execution
environment from JPF to a more lightweight instrumentation, as is the case with other
similar frameworks such as PEX [TH08] and JCute [SA06].
3.2.3.3 Explorer
The Explorer organizes recorded constraints into a constraints tree, decides which parts
of the program to explore, when to stop, and how to solve constraints for new concrete input
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values.
To hit interesting paths quickly when analyzing large systems, JDart needs to be able
to limit exploration to certain paths. JDart provides conﬁguration options for specifying
multiple predetermined vectors of input values from which the exploration is started. It also
allows the user to specify assumptions on input parameters as symbolic constraints. JDart
will then only explore a method within the limits of those assumptions. Finally, JDart
can be conﬁgured to skip exploration of certain parts of a program (e.g., after entering a
speciﬁc method), i.e., it supports suspending and resuming exploration based on method
level descriptions. It also allows skipping exploration after a certain depth.
For large-scale systems, it is often not possible to run an analysis to completion. Some-
times, one may even be interested in recording the path constraint of a single program
path (cf., e.g., SAGE [GLM12]). JDart provides an interface for implementing customized
termination strategies. So far, it provides strategies for terminating after a ﬁxed number of
paths and for terminating after a ﬁxed amount of time.
In sizable software systems, path constraints can be long and complex and may contain
trigonometric or elementary functions, which may challenge any advanced constraint solver.
JDart provides several techniques and extension points for optimizing constraints, e.g., by
simplifying path constraints, adding auxiliary deﬁnitions and/or interpolation that help solv-
ing complex constraints, and using specialized solvers. These capabilities are based on the
constraint processing features of JConstraints. For example, trigonometric constraints
can be approximated by interpolation before being submitted to a solver (e.g., Z3) or they
can be delegated directly to a solver that supports them (e.g., Coral).
Floating-point constraints can also be processed before submitting them to a solver. For
the Z3 integration, ﬂoating-point constraints are approximated using reals. Despite this not
being sound (due to the limited-precision eﬀects), it might frequently yield valuable solutions
even when they are incorrect. In general, JDart always analyzes the solutions and tests
whether they can be used to exercise previously unexplored paths.
Finally, it is important to guarantee that progress is made when only approximating the
Java semantics in solvers. Sometimes, a solution suggested by a solver may not be valid for a
Java bytecode program. JDart tests all valuations produced by a decision procedure on the
constraints tree by evaluating path constraints with the Java semantics before re-executing
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the program with a new valuation. (This is a feature provided by JConstraints, as
explained later in this section.)
3.2.3.4 JConstraints
JConstraints is a constraint solver abstraction layer for Java. It provides an object
representation for logic expressions, uniﬁed access to diﬀerent SMT and interpolation solvers,
and useful tools and algorithms for working with constraints. While JConstraints was
developed for JDart, it is maintained as a stand-alone library that can be used indepen-
dently. The idea has been explored by others, e.g., PySMT [GM15], which was developed
for the Python programming language.
The architecture of JConstraints is shown in Figure 3.4. It consists of the basic library
providing the object representation of logic and arithmetic expressions, the API deﬁnitions
for solvers (for SMT solving and interpolation, or for incremental solving), and some basic
utilities for working with expression objects (basic simpliﬁcation, term replacement, and
term evaluation). Plugins for connecting to diﬀerent constraint solvers can be added easily
by implementing a solver interface and taking care of translating between a solver-speciﬁc
API and the object representation of JConstraints.
Currently, plugins exist for connecting to the SMT solver Z3 [dMB08], the interpolation
solver SMTInterpol [CHN12], the meta-heuristic-based constraint solver Coral [SBdP11],
and a solver that implements the concolic walk algorithm [DA14]. JConstraints uses the
native interfaces for these solvers as they are much faster than the ﬁle-based integration.
It can also parse and export constraints in its own format and supports a subset of the
SMT-LIB format [smt17], which enables connection to many constraint solvers that support
Figure 3.4. Architecture of JConstraints.
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this format. For example, through the SMT-LIB format, we were able to experiment with
using the dReal solver [GKC13] for nonlinear constraints in JDart.
JConstraints supports both Java and user-deﬁned types for expressions. This enables
it to record path constraints directly in terms of the analyzed program types and semantics,
as opposed to the types supported by the constraint solver to be used. An advantage of
this feature is that it is easy to validate solutions returned by constraint solvers by simply
evaluating the path constraint stored by JConstraints with the Java semantics.
3.2.3.5 Handling Native Code
A limitation of JDart’s approach to symbolic execution of Java programs is that native
code is outside the scope of the analysis. Based on the Nhandler extension [SB14] to JPF,
JDart oﬀers two strategies for dealing with native code:
• Concrete Native. In this mode, JDart executes native code on concrete data values,
and no symbolic execution of native parts is performed. Only concrete values are
passed to and from native calls, and symbolic values are not updated and cannot taint
native return values. The return value is annotated with a new symbolic variable. As
a consequence, the concrete side of an execution is faithful to the respective execution
on a normal JVM. However, branches in the native code are not recorded in symbolic
path conditions, which can lead to JDart not being able to explore branches after
a native call. Another downside of this mode is that the implementation in JPF is
relatively slow.
• No Native. In this mode, JDart does not execute native code at all. Instead, it
returns a default concrete value every time a native method is called and a return
value is expected. The concrete value is annotated with the corresponding symbolic
variable, using the method signature of the native method as the name of that variable.
Concrete execution, in this case, is not faithful to the respective execution on a normal
JVM as the introduced default values in most cases are not equal to the values that
would be returned by the actual method invocations (and side eﬀects are ignored as
well). Recorded symbolic branches cannot be explored even if solutions are found by
a constraint solver as there currently is no mechanism that allows feeding these values
into the execution (instead of the default return values of native methods).
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3.3.1 Generation of Sequences
The ﬁrst stage of every iteration of our algorithm is feedback-directed random testing us-
ing Randoop, which generates constructor+method sequences as described in Section 3.2.2.
Randoop takes advantage of a pool of concrete primitive values to be used as construc-
tor/method arguments when generating sequences. In the ﬁrst iteration, we use the default
pool with few values, which for the integer type are -1, 0 1, 10, 100. Hence, an instance of
a generated sequence for our running example from Figure 3.1 is the following:
void test1() {
Absolute abs = new Absolute(100);
abs.difference(1);
}
Our algorithm grows the pool for subsequent iterations with concrete inputs generated
by dynamic symbolic execution, which we describe later. The sequences generated in this
stage serve two purposes. First, we employ them as standalone unit tests that exercise the
SUT, which is their original intended purpose. Second, our hybrid algorithm also employs
them as driver programs to be used in the subsequent dynamic symbolic execution stage.
3.3.2 Selection and Transformation of Sequences
The previous stage typically generates far too many sequences to be successfully explored
with a dynamic symbolic execution engine in a reasonable amount of time. For example,
several thousand valid sequences are often generated in just a few seconds. Hence, it is
prudent to select a promising subset of the generated sequences to be transformed into inputs
for the subsequent dynamic symbolic execution with JDart. The second stage implements
the selection and transformation of constructor+method sequences.
Note that dynamic symbolic execution techniques have limitations, which is why we
implemented the hybrid approach in the ﬁrst place. In particular, they can typically treat
symbolically only method arguments of primitive types. For example, if a sequence contains
method calls with non-primitive types only, JDart will not be able to explore any additional
paths. Hence, not every generated sequence is suitable for dynamic symbolic execution with
JDart, and as the ﬁrst step of this stage, we ﬁlter out all sequences with no arguments
of a primitive type. Next, we have two strategies (i.e., heuristics) for selecting promising
sequences. The ﬁrst strategy randomly selects a subset of sequences. The second strategy
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prioritizes candidate sequences with more symbolic variables, which is based on the intuition
that having more symbolic variables leads to more paths (and also branches and instructions)
being covered. We compare the two strategies in our empirical evaluation. Once promising
sequences are selected, they have to be appropriately transformed into driver programs for
JDart.
Every candidate sequence is transformed for the ﬁnal stage where dynamic symbolic
execution is performed. This is achieved by turning all constructor/method arguments
of primitive types, which are supported by JDart, into symbolic input values. In our
implementation, this is a simple source-to-source transformation. For instance, our example
sequence results in the following driver program:
public class TestClass {
void test1(int sym0, int sym1) {
Absolute abs = new Absolute(sym0);
abs.difference(sym1);
}
public static void main(String[] args) {




In the driver, the integer inputs to constructor Absolute and method difference are
transformed into the arguments of the test1 test method. The test1 method is called from
the main method that is added as an entry point for dynamic symbolic execution. Finally,
JDart is instructed that the sym0 and sym1 inputs to test1 are treated symbolically.
3.3.3 Dynamic Symbolic Execution of Sequences
The last stage of every iteration is exploring the generated driver programs using dynamic
symbolic execution as implemented in JDart. JDart explores paths through each driver
program by solving path constraints over the speciﬁed symbolic inputs as described in
Section 3.2.1. In the process, it generates additional unit tests, where each unit test
corresponds to an explored path. The generated unit tests are added into the ﬁnal set
of unit tests. In addition to generating these unit tests, we also collect all the concrete input
values that JDart generates in the process. We add these values back into Randoop’s
concrete primitive value pool for the sequence generation stage of the next iteration. By
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doing this, we feed the information that the dynamic symbolic execution generates back into
the feedback-directed random testing stage.
3.4 Experimental Evaluation
We aim to answer the following research questions using the results of our empirical
evaluation.
1. Can JDoop cover paths that plain random test case generation does not, and how big
is the positive impact of covering such paths? To answer this question, we compare
the performance of Randoop (as our baseline) and JDoop, using code coverage as a
metric for the quality of the generated test suites.
2. Can dynamic symbolic execution enable randomized test case generation to access
regions of a SUT that remain untested otherwise, i.e., does the feedback loop from
JDart to Randoop (see Figure 3.5) have a measurable impact on achieved cover-
age? To answer this question, we run JDoop in multiple conﬁgurations with varying
amounts of runtime attributed to Randoop and JDart, enabling a feedback loop in
some conﬁgurations and preventing it in others.
3. What are the constituting factors impacting the eﬀectiveness of JDoop in terms of
the code coverage that can be achieved through automated generation of test suites?
More speciﬁcally, can we conﬁrm or refute the conjecture from related work [GFA13]
that robustness of the used dynamic symbolic execution engine is pivotal or do other
factors exist that have an impact on the achievable coverage (e.g., selection of test
cases for symbolic execution)? To answer this question, we analyze statistics produced
by JDart and vary the strategy in JDoop for selecting method sequences for execu-
tion with JDart as discussed in Section 3.3 (either selecting sequences randomly or
prioritizing those with many symbolic variables).
In the remainder of this section, we introduce the benchmarks we used in our evaluation,
describe our experimental setup, and present and discuss the results of the evaluation.
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3.4.1 Benchmarks
We performed our empirical evaluation using the SF110 benchmark suite [sf113]. The
suite consists of 110 Java projects that were randomly selected from the SourceForge
repository of free software to reduce the threat to external validity (see Section 3.6). In
our evaluation, we chose the largest subset of SF110 that both JDoop and Randoop can
successfully execute on. Benchmarks that were excluded can be grouped into the following
categories: unsuitable environment, inadequate or empty benchmarks, and deﬁciencies
of testing tools. In the unsuitable environment category, benchmarks require privileged
permissions in the operating system, a properly set conﬁguration ﬁle, or a graphical sub-
system to be available. There are several empty benchmarks, benchmarks that call the
System.exit() method that is not trapped by testing tools, and benchmarks that are
otherwise inadequate because of conﬂicting dependencies with our testing infrastructure.
Finally, for some benchmarks, Randoop generates test cases that do not compile. All such
problematic benchmarks were excluded from consideration, which left us with 41 benchmarks
total, as listed in Table 3.1. For each benchmark, we list the number of instructions,
branches, methods, and classes, which demonstrates we use a wide range of SUTs in terms
of their size and complexity.
3.4.2 Experimental Setup
We used two tools in our empirical evaluation: JDoop and Randoop (version 3.0.10).
For the comparison, we used Randoop 3.0.10, which is a version released after several
months of interaction with the Randoop authors, during which we reported numerous
issues and bugs that we found in the tool. We used JDoop 2.0 in the comparison, which is
the latest version. In the evaluation, we explored several conﬁgurations of JDoop, where
each conﬁguration is determined by three parameters. The ﬁrst parameter is the time limit
for the ﬁrst stage of every iteration, which is when Randoop runs (see Section 3.2.2); we vary
this parameter as 1, 9, and 20 minutes. The second parameter is the time limit for the second
and third stages combined, which is when JDart runs; we vary this parameter as 1, 9, and
40 minutes. The third parameter determines the strategy for selecting constructor+method
call sequences as candidates for dynamic symbolic execution between: (1) random selection
(denoted by ’R’), and (2) prioritization based on the number of symbolic variables (denoted
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Table 3.1. Benchmarks from SF110 used in the evaluation.
Benchmark Branches Instructions Methods Classes
1_tullibee 915 8402 204 19
2_a4j 544 9773 522 45
3_gaj 22 415 52 10
5_templateit 564 5391 195 23
6_jnfe 132 7545 339 52
7_sfmis 146 4386 185 19
9_falselight 16 1189 32 14
11_imsmart 103 2244 86 17
13_jdbacl 3098 49385 1578 198
14_omjstate 52 954 67 14
16_templatedetails 38 656 87 24
22_byuic 2124 15031 195 14
23_jwbf 949 16032 609 86
26_jipa 128 1488 36 5
28_greencow 0 7 2 1
30_bpmail 208 3372 208 32
31_xisemele 150 3036 269 50
34_sbmlreader2 76 1447 26 8
37_petsoar 208 3445 377 58
42_asphodel 64 1139 101 20
46_nutzenportfolio 1183 18335 826 62
47_dvd-homevideo 376 10670 161 48
48_resources4j 312 3223 104 12
49_diebierse 197 4859 185 19
50_biff 814 7348 49 6
53_shp2kml 26 656 30 6
55_lavalamp 128 2907 236 48
63_objectexplorer 959 14118 902 84
65_gsftp 517 6587 181 32
67_gae-app-manager 68 1405 46 8
68_biblestudy 424 6005 313 23
69_lhamacaw 2016 51698 1437 101
72_battlecry 674 9550 130 15
74_fixsuite 374 6520 241 36
76_dash-framework 12 188 37 17
79_twfbplayer 1132 18315 902 160
84_ifx-framework 299 136363 26257 3900
90_dcparseargs 88 654 21 6
94_jclo 110 1094 43 4
95_celwars2009 850 15208 164 32
98_trans-locator 40 1097 39 6
by ’P’). Each conﬁguration is code-named as JDoop-O-J-S, where O is the time limit
for Randoop, J is the time limit for JDart, and S is the sequence selection strategy
used. We explored the following six JDoop conﬁgurations: JDoop-1-9-P, JDoop-1-9-R,
JDoop-9-1-P, JDoop-9-1-R, JDoop-20-40-P, and JDoop-20-40-R.
We carried out the evaluation in the Emulab testbed infrastructure [WLS+02]. We used
20 identical machines, each of which was equipped with two 2.4 GHz 64-bit 8-core processors,
64 GB of DDR4 RAM, and an SSD disk; the machines were running Ubuntu 16.04. We
developed our testing infrastructure around the Apache Spark cluster computing framework.
To facilitate reproducibility, each execution of a testing tool on a benchmark is performed
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in a pristine sandboxed virtualization environment. This is achieved via LXC containers
running a reproducible build of Debian GNU/Linux code-named Stretch. We allocated four
dedicated CPU cores and 8 GB of RAM to each container. Both Randoop and JDoop
are multithreaded, and hence they utilized the multiple available CPU cores. Our testing
infrastructure is freely available for others to use and extend.2
We allocate a 1-hour time limit per benchmark per testing tool/conﬁguration for test
case generation. Subsequent test case compilation and code coverage measurement phases
are not counted toward the 1-hour time limit. Given that both Randoop and JDoop
employ randomized heuristics, we repeat each run ﬁve times to account for this variability:
for each benchmark we compute an average and a standard deviation. In terms of code
coverage metrics, we measure instruction and branch coverage at the Java bytecode level
using JaCoCo [jac17]. Furthermore, to get more insights into the performance of JDoop’s
symbolic execution engine (JDart), we collect statistics on the number of successful and
failed runs, additional test cases it generates, symbolic variables in driver programs, times
a constraint solver could not ﬁnd valuation for a path condition, and JDart runs that
explored one path versus multiple paths.
3.4.3 Evaluation of Test Coverage
Table 3.2 gives branch coverage and Table 3.3 gives instruction coverage results for each
tool and conﬁguration on all of the benchmarks. Figure 3.6 and Figure 3.7 provide the
same results in a graphical form. Most results are stable across multiple runs, meaning that
the calculated standard deviations are very small. In particular, the standard deviations
for Randoop on a vast majority of benchmarks are 0, even though we used a diﬀerent
random seed for every run. This suggests that Randoop reaches saturation and is unable
to cover more branches. For the most part, there are no major diﬀerences in terms of
the achieved coverage between diﬀerent tools/conﬁgurations. However, JDoop (in one of
its conﬁgurations) consistently achieves higher coverage than Randoop. Given that pure
Randoop saturates, we can conclude that the improvements in coverage we observe with
JDoop are due to leveraging dynamic symbolic execution. Among JDoop conﬁgurations,
2The testing infrastructure is available under the GNU Affero GPLv3+ license at https://github.com/
soarlab/jdoop-wrapper.
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Table 3.2. Branch coverage results in percentage points. The results are averaged across
ﬁve runs and including standard deviations. Highest coverage per benchmark is given in
bold.
Benchmark Randoop 1-9-P 1-9-R 9-1-P 9-1-R 20-40-P 20-40-R
1_tullibee 28.0± 1.2 29.4± 1.4 29.7± 1.0 29.4± 0.0 31.6± 0.5 28.7± 0.0 29.0± 0.2
2_a4j 58.5± 0.5 57.9± 0.0 60.0± 0.6 59.6± 0.2 62.4± 0.1 60.7± 0.1 60.7± 0.0
3_gaj 40.9± 0.0 40.9± 0.0 40.9± 0.0 40.9± 0.0 40.9± 0.0 40.9± 0.0 40.9± 0.0
5_templateit 2.1± 0.0 2.1± 0.0 2.1± 0.0 2.1± 0.0 2.1± 0.0 2.1± 0.0 2.1± 0.0
6_jnfe 48.5± 0.0 48.5± 0.0 48.5± 0.0 48.5± 0.0 48.5± 0.0 48.5± 0.0 48.5± 0.0
7_sfmis 35.9± 0.9 40.4± 4.2 39.7± 4.2 42.5± 0.0 40.5± 5.5 37.5± 2.7 37.1± 2.7
9_falselight 6.3± 0.0 6.3± 0.0 6.3± 0.0 6.3± 0.0 6.3± 0.0 6.3± 0.0 6.3± 0.0
11_imsmart 17.5± 0.0 17.5± 0.0 17.5± 0.0 17.5± 0.0 17.5± 0.0 17.5± 0.0 17.5± 0.0
13_jdbacl 36.6± 0.7 32.2± 3.1 32.2± 1.8 37.0± 0.5 38.5± 0.6 34.2± 1.0 33.6± 0.8
14_omjstate 48.1± 0.0 48.1± 0.0 48.1± 0.0 48.1± 0.0 48.8± 3.1 42.3± 0.0 42.3± 0.0
16_templatedetails 71.1± 0.0 68.4± 0.0 70.0± 1.8 71.1± 0.0 71.1± 0.0 68.4± 0.0 68.4± 0.0
22_byuic 7.8± 0.0 7.8± 0.0 7.8± 0.0 7.8± 0.0 7.8± 0.0 7.8± 0.0 7.8± 0.0
23_jwbf 26.6± 2.1 26.5± 1.7 27.2± 0.9 28.0± 0.6 28.2± 1.9 26.1± 0.5 26.0± 0.0
26_jipa 18.8± 0.0 24.2± 0.0 24.2± 0.0 24.2± 0.0 24.2± 0.0 23.4± 0.0 23.4± 0.0
28_greencow 0.0± 0.0 0.0± 0.0 0.0± 0.0 0.0± 0.0 0.0± 0.0 0.0± 0.0 0.0± 0.0
30_bpmail 36.9± 0.5 36.9± 1.5 36.1± 1.2 37.3± 0.6 37.2± 0.6 37.2± 0.6 37.1± 0.5
31_xisemele 0.0± 0.0 0.0± 0.0 0.0± 0.0 0.0± 0.0 0.0± 0.0 0.0± 0.0 0.0± 0.0
34_sbmlreader2 10.5± 0.0 10.5± 0.0 10.5± 0.0 10.5± 0.0 10.5± 0.0 10.5± 0.0 10.5± 0.0
37_petsoar 54.1± 0.7 52.8± 1.6 52.9± 1.4 53.4± 0.0 53.4± 0.0 53.7± 0.7 53.7± 0.7
42_asphodel 9.4± 0.0 9.4± 0.0 9.4± 0.0 9.4± 0.0 9.4± 0.0 9.4± 0.0 9.4± 0.0
46_nutzenportfolio 5.5± 0.0 5.2± 0.0 5.3± 1.6 5.6± 0.0 5.6± 0.6 5.5± 0.0 5.5± 0.0
47_dvd-homevideo 0.8± 0.0 0.8± 0.0 0.8± 0.0 0.8± 0.0 0.8± 0.0 0.8± 0.0 0.8± 0.0
48_resources4j 0.6± 0.0 0.6± 0.0 0.6± 0.0 0.6± 0.0 0.6± 0.0 0.6± 0.0 0.6± 0.0
49_diebierse 13.7± 0.0 13.4± 3.0 19.7± 1.0 14.2± 0.0 15.2± 15.1 13.7± 0.0 18.6± 13.1
50_biff 0.1± 0.0 0.1± 0.0 0.1± 0.0 0.1± 0.0 0.1± 0.0 0.1± 0.0 0.1± 0.0
53_shp2kml 19.2± 0.0 19.2± 0.0 19.2± 0.0 19.2± 0.0 19.2± 0.0 19.2± 0.0 19.2± 0.0
55_lavalamp 49.8± 0.6 48.4± 0.0 48.8± 1.6 51.9± 0.7 52.0± 0.7 48.4± 0.0 48.0± 2.0
63_objectexplorer 25.3± 0.0 24.6± 1.8 24.5± 1.0 26.4± 0.3 26.3± 0.9 25.0± 0.0 25.0± 0.2
65_gsftp 9.8± 1.0 9.9± 1.0 10.0± 0.9 9.9± 0.0 9.9± 0.0 9.5± 0.0 9.5± 0.0
67_gae-app-manager 2.9± 0.0 2.9± 0.0 2.9± 0.0 2.9± 0.0 2.9± 0.0 2.9± 0.0 2.9± 0.0
68_biblestudy 37.5± 0.0 36.9± 0.7 37.0± 0.4 37.3± 0.0 37.2± 0.8 37.0± 0.0 37.0± 0.0
69_lhamacaw 42.7± 0.4 40.1± 0.6 39.9± 1.0 46.1± 0.5 45.7± 0.6 40.3± 0.7 40.1± 0.4
72_battlecry 0.1± 0.0 0.1± 0.0 0.1± 0.0 0.1± 0.0 0.1± 0.0 0.1± 0.0 0.1± 0.0
74_fixsuite 17.5± 6.5 17.1± 3.1 15.5± 1.3 19.2± 1.8 19.6± 4.0 17.4± 2.8 17.2± 3.3
76_dash-framework 50.0± 0.0 50.0± 0.0 50.0± 0.0 50.0± 0.0 50.0± 0.0 50.0± 0.0 50.0± 0.0
79_twfbplayer 27.3± 0.0 23.2± 1.8 21.5± 1.3 29.4± 0.0 29.3± 1.0 29.5± 0.0 29.4± 0.1
84_ifx-framework 30.8± 0.0 32.6± 9.7 31.0± 8.9 32.9± 2.8 32.0± 2.8 29.5± 4.9 28.8± 2.3
90_dcparseargs 64.8± 0.0 64.8± 0.0 64.8± 0.0 64.8± 0.0 64.8± 0.0 64.8± 0.0 64.8± 0.0
94_jclo 42.7± 0.0 46.0± 1.6 44.5± 0.0 44.5± 0.0 44.7± 0.8 44.5± 0.0 44.5± 0.0
95_celwars2009 2.1± 0.0 2.1± 0.0 2.1± 0.0 2.2± 5.2 2.1± 0.0 2.1± 0.0 2.1± 0.0
98_trans-locator 25.0± 0.0 15.0± 36.5 18.0± 37.7 25.0± 0.0 27.0± 3.7 25.0± 0.0 25.0± 0.0
best-performing are the two 9-1 conﬁgurations where in an iteration Randoop runs for nine
minutes and JDart for one minute; there are six such iterations in the 1-hour time limit.
Table 3.4 gives the total number of generated test cases. We do not observe a correlation
between the number of generated test cases and achieved coverage. The JDoop-9-1-P
conﬁguration almost always generates the highest number of test cases. We conjecture that
this is because more new concrete values are discovered by JDart than in the JDoop-9-
1-R conﬁguration (see Table 3.5), which leads to new test cases being generated faster by
Randoop.
3.4.4 Profiling Dynamic Symbolic Execution
To analyze the potential impact of the robustness of dynamic symbolic execution on the
validity of our results, we collected data from runs on all benchmarks for all conﬁgurations.
We perform this analysis on data from single runs of JDoop as the other results show very
59
Table 3.3. Instruction coverage results in percentage points. The results are averaged across
ﬁve runs and including standard deviations. Highest coverage per benchmark is given in
bold.
Benchmark Randoop 1-9-P 1-9-R 9-1-P 9-1-R 20-40-P 20-40-R
1_tullibee 42.1± 0.5 43.1± 0.2 43.0± 0.4 42.8± 0.0 43.2± 0.2 42.7± 0.0 42.7± 0.0
2_a4j 82.3± 0.4 83.2± 0.0 83.4± 0.2 83.0± 0.0 84.3± 0.1 83.1± 0.0 83.1± 0.0
3_gaj 59.3± 0.0 59.3± 0.0 59.3± 0.0 59.3± 0.0 59.3± 0.0 59.3± 0.0 59.3± 0.0
5_templateit 8.5± 0.0 8.5± 0.0 8.5± 0.0 8.5± 0.0 8.5± 0.0 8.5± 0.0 8.5± 0.0
6_jnfe 79.2± 0.0 79.2± 0.0 79.2± 0.0 79.2± 0.0 79.2± 0.0 79.2± 0.0 79.2± 0.0
7_sfmis 68.0± 0.1 69.5± 0.9 69.2± 1.0 70.5± 0.0 69.7± 1.5 68.4± 0.4 68.2± 0.4
9_falselight 39.8± 0.0 42.0± 0.0 42.0± 0.0 42.0± 0.0 42.0± 0.0 39.8± 0.0 39.8± 0.0
11_imsmart 33.9± 0.0 33.9± 0.0 33.9± 0.0 33.9± 0.0 33.9± 0.0 33.4± 0.0 33.4± 0.0
13_jdbacl 52.1± 0.6 47.4± 1.4 47.6± 1.7 50.9± 1.7 52.1± 1.2 49.5± 1.5 49.4± 2.0
14_omjstate 38.5± 0.0 38.5± 0.0 38.5± 0.0 38.5± 0.0 38.9± 2.4 37.2± 0.0 37.2± 0.0
16_templatedetails 89.3± 0.0 83.5± 0.0 86.0± 3.1 89.3± 0.0 89.3± 0.0 83.5± 0.0 83.5± 0.0
22_byuic 17.8± 0.0 17.8± 0.0 18.0± 0.0 17.8± 0.0 18.0± 0.0 17.8± 0.0 17.8± 0.0
23_jwbf 50.0± 0.4 50.1± 0.5 50.4± 0.3 50.7± 0.2 50.8± 0.8 49.7± 0.1 49.7± 0.0
26_jipa 50.8± 0.0 52.9± 0.0 52.9± 0.0 52.9± 0.0 52.9± 0.0 52.9± 0.0 52.9± 0.0
28_greencow 42.9± 0.0 42.9± 0.0 42.9± 0.0 42.9± 0.0 42.9± 0.0 42.9± 0.0 42.9± 0.0
30_bpmail 42.3± 0.0 42.3± 0.2 41.9± 0.7 42.3± 0.2 42.3± 0.1 42.2± 0.4 42.3± 0.1
31_xisemele 6.6± 0.0 6.6± 0.0 6.6± 0.0 6.6± 0.0 6.6± 0.0 6.6± 0.0 6.6± 0.0
34_sbmlreader2 11.0± 0.0 11.0± 0.0 11.0± 0.0 11.0± 0.0 11.0± 0.0 11.0± 0.0 11.0± 0.0
37_petsoar 63.5± 0.5 62.9± 1.0 62.9± 0.7 63.0± 0.1 63.0± 0.0 63.6± 0.5 63.6± 0.5
42_asphodel 26.4± 0.0 26.4± 0.0 26.4± 0.0 26.4± 0.0 26.4± 0.0 26.4± 0.0 26.4± 0.0
46_nutzenportfolio 16.6± 0.1 16.5± 0.1 16.5± 0.1 16.7± 0.0 16.7± 0.0 16.6± 0.0 16.6± 0.0
47_dvd-homevideo 2.0± 0.0 2.0± 0.0 2.0± 0.0 2.0± 0.0 2.0± 0.0 2.0± 0.0 2.0± 0.0
48_resources4j 3.7± 0.0 3.7± 0.0 3.7± 0.0 3.7± 0.0 3.7± 0.0 3.7± 0.0 3.7± 0.0
49_diebierse 23.3± 0.3 22.7± 0.8 23.4± 1.0 23.3± 0.0 23.4± 0.8 23.2± 0.0 23.6± 0.8
50_biff 3.5± 0.0 3.5± 0.0 3.5± 0.0 3.5± 0.0 3.5± 0.0 3.5± 0.0 3.5± 0.0
53_shp2kml 38.0± 0.0 38.0± 0.0 38.0± 0.0 38.0± 0.0 38.0± 0.0 38.0± 0.0 38.0± 0.0
55_lavalamp 64.8± 0.1 63.4± 0.0 63.7± 0.7 65.2± 0.9 65.0± 0.1 64.1± 0.0 64.1± 0.2
63_objectexplorer 27.3± 0.0 25.9± 1.8 26.0± 1.6 27.8± 0.2 27.9± 0.4 26.5± 0.1 26.6± 0.4
65_gsftp 10.1± 0.0 10.2± 0.0 10.2± 0.0 10.2± 0.0 10.2± 0.0 10.2± 0.0 10.2± 0.0
67_gae-app-manager 55.1± 0.0 55.1± 0.0 55.1± 0.0 55.1± 0.0 55.1± 0.0 55.1± 0.0 55.1± 0.0
68_biblestudy 40.3± 0.0 39.9± 0.4 40.0± 0.2 40.0± 0.0 40.1± 0.4 40.0± 0.0 40.0± 0.0
69_lhamacaw 41.1± 0.4 39.5± 0.5 39.5± 0.5 42.4± 0.5 42.2± 0.6 39.5± 0.9 39.3± 0.2
72_battlecry 0.5± 0.0 0.5± 0.0 0.5± 0.0 0.5± 0.0 0.5± 0.0 0.5± 0.0 0.5± 0.0
74_fixsuite 38.1± 11.2 42.8± 0.4 34.3± 0.2 43.7± 0.2 43.7± 0.5 43.0± 0.5 42.8± 0.4
76_dash-framework 66.0± 0.0 66.0± 0.0 66.0± 0.0 66.0± 0.0 66.0± 0.0 66.0± 0.0 66.0± 0.0
79_twfbplayer 33.9± 0.0 36.5± 0.6 35.9± 0.3 40.6± 0.0 40.6± 0.5 41.5± 0.0 41.5± 0.0
84_ifx-framework 91.1± 0.0 91.1± 0.1 91.1± 0.1 91.1± 0.0 91.1± 0.0 91.1± 0.0 91.0± 0.0
90_dcparseargs 55.0± 0.0 55.0± 0.0 55.0± 0.0 55.0± 0.0 55.0± 0.0 55.0± 0.0 55.0± 0.0
94_jclo 54.9± 0.0 56.4± 0.7 55.6± 0.0 55.6± 0.0 55.6± 0.0 55.6± 0.0 55.6± 0.0
95_celwars2009 3.3± 0.0 3.3± 0.0 3.3± 0.0 3.3± 0.4 3.3± 0.0 3.3± 0.0 3.3± 0.0























































































































































































































































































Figure 3.6. Branch coverage for Randoop and JDoop. The results are averaged across
ﬁve runs, where each tool and variant was given a time limit of 1 hour to generate test cases.
























































































































































































































































































Figure 3.7. Instruction coverage for Randoop and JDoop. The results are averaged
across ﬁve runs, where each tool and variant was given a time limit of 1 hour to generate
test cases. Whiskers denote one standard deviation.
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Table 3.4. Total number of generated test cases averaged across ﬁve runs. The highest and
lowest number of test cases per benchmark are given in bold and italic, respectively.
Benchmark Randoop 1-9-P 1-9-R 9-1-P 9-1-R 20-40-P 20-40-R
1_tullibee 327899 294360 218567 571372 780346 282531 205016
2_a4j 204778 22430 59123 57651 329367 104675 100769
3_gaj 92133 40605 29663 189206 124280 67709 45936
5_templateit 2492 30552 20002 29081 15570 6035 4930
6_jnfe 296501 91062 81575 411531 423452 119809 117743
7_sfmis 106590 106868 97875 312046 291029 76176 68942
9_falselight 253605 349925 185775 571283 648156 260382 156277
11_imsmart 92394 71420 70246 139685 134544 52892 48136
13_jdbacl 144769 54511 40490 213840 224082 100376 66342
14_omjstate 45258 19897 15383 88114 67370 36586 26753
16_templatedetails 85941 31274 29697 180662 147381 47189 42105
22_byuic 203736 171090 95498 783132 464633 231769 123310
23_jwbf 309571 101580 83989 537897 501119 190664 149524
26_jipa 10197 26398 17360 56892 30887 13684 9424
28_greencow 2 61 61 8 8 4 4
30_bpmail 192152 74257 64353 351093 325983 107954 91627
31_xisemele 169051 158073 138714 214357 472635 131312 113848
34_sbmlreader2 216223 98801 83708 484943 445669 149068 118315
37_petsoar 123934 44107 36463 201709 173353 71551 58942
42_asphodel 182354 77112 65025 362966 332233 114756 97165
46_nutzenportfolio 159105 38417 27140 250170 178543 127859 72222
47_dvd-homevideo 4551 51445 29280 51645 27500 8615 6189
48_resources4j 124493 46543 42517 238827 222356 77351 66348
49_diebierse 14882 65940 39903 301354 185464 74089 38992
50_biff 88873 241906 226403 162718 156676 128378 126911
53_shp2kml 159534 204167 118299 575603 404853 171718 100513
55_lavalamp 83663 20073 19950 103958 100395 57446 43075
63_objectexplorer 81502 57088 41593 248669 173910 70776 49294
65_gsftp 160055 122839 68688 619504 352394 178501 97830
67_gae-app-manager 8712 6492 6314 11631 8585 5666 5477
68_biblestudy 197945 66947 41936 279601 276622 143229 96125
69_lhamacaw 47097 26450 19109 121782 79115 47412 28249
72_battlecry 63 3143 3143 399 399 175 175
74_fixsuite 34597 33743 23190 125728 79302 41445 24942
76_dash-framework 27430 66864 66977 43307 43106 36546 33940
79_twfbplayer 3818 8083 6790 14152 8529 8930 6753
84_ifx-framework 98087 137964 136555 215055 213937 141820 136549
90_dcparseargs 100995 46582 32062 245450 159392 64925 43534
94_jclo 129468 67316 50617 163389 244185 85283 65468
95_celwars2009 172279 191373 100317 751397 409514 207416 105749
98_trans-locator 96104 78569 44926 350256 216182 110986 61545
little variation of results between diﬀerent runs in most cases. Table 3.5 reports statistics
on the JDart operation in diﬀerent series of experiments. Data in the table are explained
and discussed in the following paragraphs.
3.4.4.1 Modes of Operation
For all of the analyzed conﬁgurations of JDoop, JDart runs successfully in the vast
majority of cases and produces signiﬁcant numbers of test cases (up to 16, 588 in total for all
benchmarks in one experiment). Most additional test cases are produced in the JDoop-1-9
conﬁgurations that enable the feedback loop between Randoop and JDart but grant the
bulk of runtime to JDart. Across all conﬁgurations, random selection of method sequences
for JDart leads to generating additional test cases for more benchmarks than prioritizing
sequences with many symbolic variables. Prioritization, on the other hand, leads to more



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3.4.4.2 Robustness and Scalability
Our data indicate that JDart is robust. Only a small number of runs fail (between 0.0%
and 2.5%). Of these failures, only a tiny fraction is due to unhandled native code (less than
1%).3 The vast majority of failed runs is caused by class-path issues in the benchmarks
(more than 99%). There are only very few cases in which the constraint solver was not able
to solve constraints of all paths in symbolic execution trees (between 0.0% and 1.75%).
Using Nhandler in the ’Concrete Native’ mode leads to native calls being executed
faithfully and to longer recorded path conditions, as discussed in Section 3.2.3.5. This yields
constraints that are marked as not solvable (“don’t know” or D/K for short) in 93.62% of
all discovered paths in symbolic execution trees. This indicates the likelihood of JDart
not being able to explore most of the paths that could be explored with proper symbolic
treatment of native methods. Table 3.6 reports the number of occurrences for all encountered
native methods in one run of JDoop. As can be seen from the data, the charAt method of
the String class oﬀers by far the greatest potential for improving on the number of explored
paths. Note, however, that numbers in the table do not necessarily translate into the same
number of additional paths as occurrences are counted along paths in trees and the same
method call may appear on multiple paths.
3.4.4.3 Amenable Test Cases
The number of symbolic variables per test case behaves as expected: it increases when
using prioritization of sequences with many variables. Prioritization, however, comes at
a cost since there tends to be more runs of JDart in conﬁgurations that do not use
3These are methods for which Nhandler was not configured to take over execution, leading to a crash
of JDart. We configured Nhandler to take care of all native methods of java.lang.String.
Table 3.6. Symbolic variables introduced by Nhandler in the ’Concrete Native’ mode in












prioritization. For all benchmarks, a high number of runs yields only one path and hence
no additional test cases. A considerable number of these runs may be attributed to using
Nhandler in the ’No Native’ mode, thereby hiding branches by not executing native code.
On the other hand, even in the experiment in which Nhandler was used in the ’Concrete
Native’ mode, two thirds of all runs explored only a single path. This indicates that many
method sequences that were selected for JDart simply do not branch on symbolic variables.
3.4.5 Discussion
The obtained results allow us to provide answers to our research questions.
3.4.5.1 Question 1: Covering More Paths
In terms of branch coverage, JDoop outperforms Randoop on 44% of the benchmarks
and there is a tie between Randoop and JDoop on 46% of the benchmarks; see Table 3.2.
(In instruction coverage, JDoop outperforms Randoop in 29% of the benchmarks; see
Table 3.3.) Measured in percentage points, the margins are relatively slim in many cases.
There are, however, cases in which the achieved branch coverage is increased by 28%,
resulting in an increase in code coverage by 5.4 percentage points (26_jipa). On 40% of the
benchmarks, no variation can be seen in coverage between the two approaches. Together
with the little variance that is observed between diﬀerent runs, this indicates that Randoop
in many cases reaches a state where coverage is (nearly) saturated. It makes sense that in
such a scenario, JDoop does not add many percentage points in code coverage. It merely
adds coverage through those hard-to-hit corner cases.
3.4.5.2 Question 2: Reachable Regions
Our results indicate that the feedback loop has a positive impact. The JDoop-9-1
conﬁgurations perform better than other conﬁgurations in most cases. Regarding the time
distribution between Randoop and JDart, the picture is not as clear. There is a lot more
variation in the margins of coverage increase (or decrease sometimes) for the conﬁguration
that grants most of the time to JDart. In one particularly amenable case, this results in
coverage increase by 43% (from 13.7% to 19.7% for 49_diebierse).
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3.4.5.3 Question 3: Robustness of Symbolic Execution
Here, we have to refute the conjecture that was made in related work [GFA13], namely
that a robust dynamic symbolic execution engine can reap big increases in code coverage,
or at least curb expectations about achievable coverage increases. Our experiments showed
that JDart handles most benchmarks without many problems. Proper analysis of native
code (especially for String methods) certainly has the potential to improve code coverage
further, but the consistently high number of symbolic analyses that result in a single path
(even in the control experiment) points to another important factor that contributes to small
margins: the generated test cases simply do not allow to explore many new branches in most
cases.
The experiments even indicate that it does not pay oﬀ to prioritize method sequences
with many variables for JDart. Prioritization adds cost twice: once for analyzing test cases
and then for exploring with many variables. Taking into account the observation from the
ﬁrst answer, that Randoop (almost) achieves saturation of coverage in 1 hour; this again
indicates that in JDoop, corner cases are discovered by JDart. Covering more search space
beats investigating the few locations more intensively in such a scenario.
3.5 Related Work
Here we present work related to our work.
3.5.1 Symbolic Execution
Dynamic symbolic execution [GKS05, SMA05] is a well-known technique implemented
by many automatic testing tools (e.g., [CDE08, GLM12, TH08, SA06]). For example,
SAGE [GLM12] is a white-box fuzzer based on dynamic symbolic execution. It has been rou-
tinely applied to large software systems, such as media players and image processors, where
it has been successful in ﬁnding security bugs. Khurshid et al. [KPV03] extend symbolic
execution to support dynamically allocated structures, preconditions, and concurrency.
Several symbolic execution tools speciﬁcally target Java bytecode programs. A num-
ber of them implement dynamic symbolic execution via Java bytecode instrumentation.
JCute [SA06], the ﬁrst dynamic symbolic execution engine for Java, uses Soot [soo17] for
instrumentation and lp_solve for constraint solving. CATG [TZHS15] uses ASM [asm17]
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for instrumentation and CVC4 [DRK+14] for constraint solving. Another dynamic symbolic
execution engine, LCT [KLS+11], supports distributed exploration; it uses Boolector and
Yices for solving, but it does not have support for ﬂoat and double primitive types. A draw-
back of instrumentation-based tools is that instrumentation at the time of class loading is
conﬁned to the system under test (SUT). For example, LCT does not by default instrument
the standard Java libraries, thus limiting symbolic execution only to the SUT classes. Hence,
the instrumentation-based tools discussed above provide the possibility of using symbolic
(and/or simpliﬁed) models for non-instrumented classes or using preinstrumented core Java
classes.
Several dynamic symbolic execution tools for Java are not based on instrumentation.
For example, the dynamic symbolic white-box fuzzer jFuzz [JHG09] is based on JPF (as
is JDart) and can thus explore core Java classes without any prerequisites. Symbolic
PathFinder (SPF) [PMB+08] is a JPF extension similar to JDart. In fact, JDart reuses
some of the core components of an older version of SPF, notably the solver interface and its
implementations. While at its core SPF implements symbolic execution, it can also switch
to concrete values in the spirit of dynamic symbolic execution [PRV11]. That enables it to
deal with limitations of constraint solvers (e.g., nonlinear constraints).
3.5.2 Hybrid Approaches
There are several approaches similar to ours that combine fuzzing or a similar testing
technique with dynamic symbolic execution. Garg et al. [GIB+13] propose a combination of
feedback-directed random testing and dynamic symbolic execution for C and C++ programs.
However, they are addressing challenges of a diﬀerent target language and on a much smaller
collection of benchmarks that they simpliﬁed before evaluation. The Driller tool [SGS+16]
interleaves fuzzing and dynamic symbolic execution for bug ﬁnding in program binaries,
and it targets single-ﬁle binaries in search of security bugs. Galeotti et al. [GFA13] apply
dynamic symbolic execution in the EvoSuite tool to explore test cases generated with a
genetic algorithm. Even though their evaluation is carried out in a diﬀerent way than
the one presented in this chapter, the general conclusion is the same in spirit: dynamic
symbolic execution does not provide a lot of additional coverage on real-world object-oriented
Java software on top of a random-based test case generation technique. MACE [CBP+11]
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combines automata learning with dynamic symbolic execution to ﬁnd security vulnerabilities
in protocol implementations.
There are automated hybrid software testing tools that do not strictly combine with sym-
bolic execution (e.g., OCAT [JKXC10], Agitator [BDS06], Evacon [IX08], Seeker [TXT+11],
DSD-Crasher [CSX08]). Because these tools either focus on a single method at a time
or just form random method call sequences, they often fail to drive program execution to
hard-to-reach sites in the SUT, which can result in suboptimal code coverage.
3.5.3 Random Testing
Randoop [PLEB07] is a feedback-directed random testing algorithm that forms random
test cases that are sequences of method calls, while ensuring basic properties such as
reﬂexivity, symmetry, and transitivity. Search-based software testing [McM11] approaches
and tools are gaining traction, which is reﬂected in four annual search-based software
testing tool competitions in recent years [RJGV16]. A prominent search-based tool is
EvoSuite [FA11], which combines a genetic algorithm and dynamic symbolic execution.
T3 [Pra16] is a randomized tool that generates constructor and method call sequences based
on an optimization function. JTExpert [SPG16] keeps track of methods that can change the
underlying object and constructs method sequences that are likely to get the object into a
desired state. All the search-based testing tools are geared toward testing at the class level,
while JDoop performs testing at the application/library level.
3.5.4 Benchmarking Infrastructures
In computer science, any extensive empirical evaluation, software competition, or re-
producible research requires a signiﬁcant software+hardware infrastructure. The Software
Veriﬁcation Competition’s BenchExec [Bey16] is a software infrastructure for evaluating
veriﬁcation tools on programs containing properties to verify. It comes with an interface
for veriﬁcation tools to follow, which did not ﬁt our needs: our coverage measurement
outcomes cannot be judged in terms of program correctness. The Search-based Software
Testing Competition [RJGV16] community created an infrastructure for the competition
as well. However, just like tools that participate in the competition, their infrastructure
is geared toward running a testing tool on just one class at a time. Emulab [WLS+02]
and Apt [RWS+15] are testbeds that provide researchers with an accessible hardware and
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software infrastructure. They allow for repeatable and reproducible research, especially in
the domain of computer systems, by providing an environment to specify used hardware, on
top of which users can install and conﬁgure a variety of systems.
3.6 Threats to Validity
In this section, we cover threats to validity of herein presented work.
3.6.1 Threats to External Validity
While the main purpose of the SF110 corpus of benchmarks is to reduce the threat to
external validity since they were chosen randomly, we cannot be absolutely sure that the
benchmarks we used are representative of Java programs. Hence, our results might not
generalize to all programs. In JDoop, we combined Randoop and JDart, and we used
Randoop as the baseline in our evaluation. We attempted to include another testing tool
into the comparison, in particular EvoSuite. However, to the best of our ability, we did
not manage to get it to work with JaCoCo (the tool we use for measuring code coverage)
despite being in contact with the EvoSuite authors; hence, we could not perform a direct
comparison and our results might not generalize to other tools. Having said that, earlier
work on EvoSuite reports similar results to ours with respect to using dynamic symbolic
execution in combination with random testing [GFA13]. Finally, note that we do not include
the environment and dependencies of benchmarks into unit test generation, which might lead
to sub-optimal coverage in some cases.
3.6.2 Threats to Internal Validity
In our evaluation, we experimented with 3 diﬀerent time allocations for Randoop and
JDart that we identiﬁed as representative. While our results show no major diﬀerences
between these diﬀerent time allocations, we did not fully explore this space and there might
be a ratio that would lead to a diﬀerent outcome. JDart currently cannot symbolically
explore native calls, which might lead to not being able to cover program paths (and hence
also branches and instructions) that depend on such calls. Our evaluation shows that this
indeed happens and that native implementations of methods of the String class in Java
are the main culprit, but it does not allow us to provide an estimate for the impact on
the achieved code coverage. Finally, while we extensively tested JDoop to make sure it is
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reliable and performed sanity checks of our results, there is a chance for a bug to have crept
in that would inﬂuence our results.
3.6.3 Threats to Construct Validity
Here, the main threat is the metrics we used to assess the quality of the generated test
suites, and in particular branch coverage. This threat is reduced by previous work showing
that branch coverage performs well as a criterion for comparing test suites [GGZ+13].
3.7 Conclusion
We introduced a hybrid automatic testing approach for object-oriented software, de-
scribed its implementation JDoop, and performed an extensive empirical exploration of this
space. Our approach is a combination of feedback-directed random testing (Randoop) and
dynamic symbolic execution (JDart), where random testing performs global exploration,
while dynamic symbolic execution performs local exploration (around interesting global
states) of the SUT. It is an iterative algorithm where these two exploration techniques are
interleaved in multiple iterations. Our evaluation on real-world object-oriented software
shows that dynamic symbolic execution provides modest, albeit consistent, improvements
in terms of code coverage on top of our baseline (pure feedback-directed random testing).
CHAPTER 4
AUTOMATIC TESTING FOR RUNTIME
VERIFICATION
This chapter is based on work published at the International Symposium on Software
Testing and Analysis 2015 [DG15].1
4.1 Introduction
The Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) is a NASA research program
that addresses the increasing load on the air traﬃc control system through innovative
algorithms and software systems. AutoResolver is a proposed NextGen component for
prediction and resolution of loss of separation between multiple aircraft in the one to eight
minutes time horizon. Loss of separation between two aircraft occurs when they are closer
to each other than a predeﬁned safe vertical or horizontal distance. Separation assurance
aims to eliminate the occurrence of loss of separation in the air space. Figure 4.1 shows a
sketch of a potential loss of separation between two aircraft and how it can be avoided by
letting one aircraft take a detour.
Testing AutoResolver presents various challenges. The input data consists of several
aircraft trajectories, each trajectory being a sequence of 4-dimensional points, where a point
represents a position in 3-dimensional space, plus a time instant. Given this complex input
1Portions of the published work are reused and reprinted here with permission.
Figure 4.1. Loss of separation and resolution. Lateral view of two aircraft, their
trajectories, and areas of horizontal separation assurance. Left: Conﬂict in the near future.
Center: Loss of separation. Right: Detour that will prevent loss of separation.
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space of the separation assurance problem, it is extremely hard to generate appropriate input
data for it. Therefore, the NextGen team typically uses historical airport data recordings
as test inputs. Each such test case usually involves (tens of) thousands of aircraft and takes
several hours to run. When unexpected behavior is detected, it is hard to create subsets
of the test case that would lead AutoResolver to similar behavior, making debugging a
complicated task.
To address these issues, the Robust Software Engineering (RSE) and NextGen groups
at the NASA Ames Research Center have been collaborating over several years for the
development of an automated, lightweight testing infrastructure for AutoResolver. In
previous work [GHI+14], Giannakopoulou et al. developed a wrapper that implements
parameterized loss of separation scenarios between two aircraft for AutoResolver. In
contrast to having trajectories as inputs, which would make it impossible for test-case
generation tools to produce realistic trajectories, these scenarios expose parameters such
as aircraft velocity and heading. These parameters provide ﬂexibility in producing many
diﬀerent types of aircraft encounters for the problem, while always producing valid trajectory
inputs that also exhibit loss of separation. Despite the fact that scenarios are limited to a
single encounter between two aircraft, the wrapper has enabled them to experiment with
both black-box and white-box test-case generation techniques, and to produce hundreds of
thousands of tests aiming at exercising diﬀerent aspects of the AutoResolver code.
A key aspect missing from their work [GHI+14] is the identiﬁcation of desirable properties
for separation assurance software, and the support for automated testing of these properties.
Introduced properties may, in turn, create additional requirements on the test-case genera-
tion itself: to exercise each property, we often need to produce complex encounter situations
that target it. In general, it is hard to identify properties for separation assurance algorithms,
as discussed in TSafe [GBS+11]. Currently, AutoResolver developers manually examine
the outcomes of every test case to determine whether the software behaves as expected.
This is impractical, more so in a setting where millions of test cases are generated and run
automatically.
The work presented in this chapter addresses these issues, thus ﬁlling an important
gap in our separation assurance testing framework. Speciﬁcally, it makes the following
contributions:
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• A set of requirements for separation assurance.
• Some of the requirements require test cases with multiple aircraft, including complex
relationships between their trajectories. We therefore implement a generalization of
the wrapper to support scenarios with any number of aircraft and loss of separation
cases between them. Some aircraft are placed strategically in order to check speciﬁc
properties of AutoResolver’s logic.
• A runtime veriﬁcation framework based on aspect-oriented programming for checking
the requirements on AutoResolver. Runtime monitoring is also used to check
property coverage by the generated tests, as well as to monitor other behaviors of the
system, as requested by its developers. The framework is completely separate from
the AutoResolver code, thus allowing us to avoid interfering with the development
process of the AutoResolver team.
• As well as being used for property monitoring, our runtime veriﬁcation framework is
used for complex test-case generation. This is, to our knowledge, a novel, atypical use
of runtime veriﬁcation.
• Application of our framework to AutoResolver and discussion of the obtained
results.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 provides preliminaries
to AutoResolver and a previous testing framework for it. Separation assurance require-
ments for a system like AutoResolver are given in Section 4.3. Section 4.4 presents
extensions to the interface and to the test-case generation capabilities of our testing frame-
work, with Section 4.5 describing the runtime veriﬁcation infrastructure that we develop
on top of it. Evaluation results follow in Section 4.6, and lessons learned are provided
in Section 4.7. Finally, related work and conclusions are discussed in Section 4.8 and
Section 4.9, respectively.
4.2 Preliminaries
This section provides a high-level description of AutoResolver and provides a brief
overview of previous work on developing a testing environment for it. Note that in the
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context of this work, we use the terms “conﬂict” and “loss of separation” interchangeably.
Moreover, by the term “conﬂict time,” or “ttlos,” we refer to the ﬁrst time point in their
trajectories at which two aircraft lose separation.
4.2.1 AutoResolver
The Advanced Airspace Concept (AAC) is aimed at automating separation assurance in
the future. AAC uses multiple independent layers of separation assurance for increased reli-
ability. One component of AAC is a strategic problem-solving tool named AutoResolver
[ELC10]. AutoResolver’s separation assurance algorithm was originally developed in the
ACES simulation environment taking full advantage of the zero-error trajectory prediction
available. Many studies of the eﬀectiveness of this algorithm in the zero-uncertainty envi-
ronment have been performed [FE07].
In each round of operation, AutoResolver attempts to resolve all the conﬂicts identi-
ﬁed by its conﬂict-detection system, but handles them in the order speciﬁed by some notion
of priority. The algorithm that it implements attempts to generate many diﬀerent types
of resolutions for each conﬂict. More speciﬁcally, AutoResolver iteratively attempts a
variety of maneuvers, and determines which ones result in successful resolutions. Among
all such resolution trajectories, AutoResolver selects the resolution that is expected to
impart the minimum airborne delay.
AutoResolver consists of approximately 65K lines of Java code. For each maneuver
that it attempts, it communicates with ACES, a simulation environment whose core consists
of approximately 450K lines of code. As mentioned, the NextGen team typically uses
historical airport data recordings as test inputs. These test cases consist of 4, 800 or 10, 000
aircraft, and take between three and seven hours to run. The results are monitored manually
by domain experts to see whether AutoResolver behaves as expected.
4.2.2 Lightweight Testing Framework
To ensure more systematic testing of the behavior of AutoResolver, potentially target-
ing some type of test coverage, Giannakopoulou et al. previously developed a lighter-weight
testing environment to complement the current testing process [GHI+14]. That testing
environment has the following features. Despite the fact that ACES is very precise, it is a
heavyweight tool that adds a signiﬁcant burden to the testing process. Giannakopoulou et al.
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therefore created stubs that replace the functionality of ACES with more approximate behav-
ior. The main capability that the ACES stubs provide is the generation and modiﬁcation of
aircraft trajectories. Stubbing ACES allowed them to run tests signiﬁcantly faster, which is
important in a setting where millions of test cases are generated and executed automatically.
Moreover, to enable meaningful test-case generation, Giannakopoulou et al. created
a modular, extensible wrapper around AutoResolver that implements parameterized
conﬂict scenarios. Note that loss of separation is handled for two aircraft at a time (all
other aircraft are called “secondary”). Each proposed resolution is evaluated against the set
of all aircraft in the airspace sector that AutoResolver is currently handling.
More precisely, the wrapper provides an interface to AutoResolver that consists of
a number of entry points where each point represents a single-conﬂict scenario suggested
by the AutoResolver team. In a Cruise scenario, each aircraft is in level ﬂight, i.e., its
altitude remains constant. In a Climb scenario, each aircraft climbs or descends for some
portion of the trajectory. Loss of separation may occur before one or both of them start
climbing or descending, during climb or descent, or after one or both of them has leveled oﬀ.
Finally, the Turn scenario is similar to Cruise, but it introduces a heading change for one
or both aircraft at some point in their trajectory. Each scenario is hard-coded in the type
of trajectories, but is parameterized on aspects like aircraft velocity, initial heading, initial
altitude, climb rate, and conﬂict time. Each concretized scenario is translated into a set of
trajectories with which the wrapper invokes AutoResolver.
In order to ensure that the test inputs that are thus generated mostly correspond to loss
of separation scenarios, the framework works as follows. A point is selected in 3-dimensional
space, representing a position at which the two aircraft will meet (note that loss of separation
actually occurs prior to the airplanes reaching that point). Aircraft are then ﬂown backwards
(headings are reversed) from their meeting point for the duration speciﬁed by the conﬂict
time parameter. The type of trajectory is as speciﬁed by the scenario, i.e., whether the
aircraft climb or cruise, for example, but speciﬁc details are parameterized, such as the time
point at which a climb trajectory levels oﬀ. Aircraft initial positions are thus computed,
and the ACES stub is then invoked to generate concrete trajectories.
The wrapper enables the application of a variety of test-case generation tools or algo-
rithms for this problem, as demonstrated in previous work. In this work, the focus is on an
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essential aspect of testing, which is how to evaluate the testing outcomes. In particular, we
want to lighten the load of domain experts in monitoring each test case. Rather, our goal is
to automatically check each test case against requirements, and focus the attention of the
domain experts only on those tests that exhibit unexpected behavior.
4.3 Separation Assurance Requirements
The ﬁrst step in verifying the behavior of AutoResolver is to create a speciﬁcation,
i.e., a set of requirements it should meet, which is not straightforward for a system that
solves an optimization problem. Through several iterations of discussions with the Au-
toResolver team, we have formed two types of requirements: veriﬁcation properties and
information monitors. Veriﬁcation properties are statements about the expected behavior
of AutoResolver. They capture the high-level logic of the system, which conveys how
the system operates in various situations. Information monitors provide a rich insight into
speciﬁcs of the logic, which are not necessarily characterized as correct or incorrect.
4.3.1 Verification Properties
P1: There should be a resolution for every conflict. The main goal of AutoResolver
is to predict and resolve conﬂicts. Therefore, it should be able to resolve every conﬂict that
occurs within its time horizon.
P2: Initial conflicts are resolved in the non-decreasing order of their time to first loss
of separation. It is important that AutoResolver handles conﬂicts with earlier conﬂict
time ﬁrst. Initial conﬂicts are those detected before a conﬂict resolution process starts.
Conﬂicts that will happen in, e.g., seven minutes are not as urgent to resolve as those that
will happen in one minute. In this way, the conﬂict resolution process prioritizes to resolve
more imminent conﬂicts ﬁrst, and move to later conﬂicts according to their time to loss of
separation.
P3: New conflicts arising as a result of conflict resolution should be inserted into the list of
conflicts according to their time to first loss of separation. As AutoResolver is resolving
initial conﬂicts, new conﬂicts can be created as a result of the resolution process. This
means that a resolution trajectory of the maneuvered aircraft has a conﬂict with another
aircraft, while its original trajectory did not have a conﬂict with the same aircraft. When
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AutoResolver picks a resolution that results in a new conﬂict, the new conﬂict should be
resolved according to its conﬂict time. This property is similar to property P2, but instead
it characterizes conﬂicts that did not exist originally.
P4: No picked resolution is allowed to cause a more imminent secondary conflict. For
every conﬂict AutoResolver tries to resolve, it attempts multiple resolutions. Among the
successful ones, it picks the best according to a set of optimization criteria. The picked
resolution should not make the situation worse by getting the aircraft into a more imminent
conﬂict than the conﬂict being resolved.
4.3.2 Information Monitors
The AutoResolver team is interested in the stability of the picked resolution’s type
for a given conﬂict if the resolution process is delayed. Each resolution has a type, such
as a horizontal maneuver, a temporary altitude change maneuver, etc. The team said that
stability is important from the perspective of people working in air traﬃc control. In other
words, the team wants to know if AutoResolver would pick a diﬀerent resolution type
for the same conﬂict, if the resolution process was to be delayed for a given amount of time.
We therefore formulate the following monitor:
M1: For each conflict, report its resolution type and how it changes over time. We explain
how we introduce a resolution delay in Section 4.4.
4.4 Extending AutoResolver’s Testing Framework
Previous work [GHI+14] supported single-conﬂict preselected scenarios, in spite of Au-
toResolver being able to resolve any number of arbitrary conﬂicts at a time. Our exten-
sions to the previous work are motivated by the need to support automated veriﬁcation of
separation assurance properties, and in particular the requirements presented in Section 4.3.
With this work, we aim to verify properties of AutoResolver’s operational logic
pertaining to more than one conﬂict. We therefore rewrite the framework interface to
support the generation of any combination of any number of conﬂicting aircraft, including
aircraft that create secondary conﬂicts (we call these secondary aircraft). An overview of
the extended framework’s architecture is provided in Figure 4.2.
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public void t e s t 0 ( ) throws Throwable {
AacTestWrapper wrapper = new AacTestWrapper ( ) ;
wrapper . setUpCR(CR_params1 , c on f l i c t_po in t 1 ) ;
wrapper . setUpCRH(CRH_params1 , c on f l i c t_po in t 1 ) ;
wrapper . setUpCL(CL_params1 , c on f l i c t_po in t 2 ) ;
wrapper . setUpCL(CL_params2 , c on f l i c t_po in t 2 ) ;
wrapper . runCon f l i c tDet e c t i onReso lu t i on ( ) ;
}
Figure 4.3. A test case with two pairs of aircraft in two independent conﬂicts.
trajectory, and the targeted conﬂict point. When all aircraft are added to the framework,
a wrapper call to AutoResolver’s detection and resolution process is made with the last
statement in the test case.
A new addition to the interface is the ability to ﬂy all aircraft for a given amount of
time before invoking AutoResolver’s conﬂict detection and resolution process. With
this ability, we stress-test AutoResolver’s conﬂict detection and resolution of the same
aircraft trajectories, but at diﬀerent time points. At the same time, it allows us to observe
how resolution types change over time. Once all aircraft are added to the framework, some
of them exhibiting loss of separation, the framework invokes AutoResolver to detect and
resolve conﬂicts between the aircraft.
4.4.2 Generating Multiple Conflicts
With the exception of P1, all the properties reason about cases where AutoResolver
handles multiple conﬂicts between more than two aircraft. In this work, we introduce a way
of generating test cases with multiple independent conﬂicts. This enables us to exercise the
properties and report potential violations.
In their previous work [GHI+14], Giannakopolou et al. generated test cases by computing
the Cartesian product of all input parameters for an interface entry point describing a pre-
selected single-conﬂict scenario. For the case of multiple conﬂicts, if we were to additionally
compute the Cartesian product across conﬂict points, the resulting number of test cases
would be prohibitively large. There are many ways in which we could handle this problem:
one would be to implement a randomized approach to creating combinations of values;
another would be to use combinatorial testing [CDPP96].
As a ﬁrst approach to the problem, we decided to introduce initial conﬂicts at points in
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the 3-dimensional space that are far enough from each other such that two aircraft involved
in a conﬂict do not interfere with aircraft from the other conﬂicts. By making the conﬂicts
isolated from each other, characteristics of one conﬂict are expected to be independent from
characteristics of every other conﬂict. Based on this, it is suﬃcient to explore the Cartesian
product of the parameter values for each conﬂict, but it is not necessary to also explore the
Cartesian product across conﬂicts.
Each initial conﬂict is described by several parameters such as the time to the ﬁrst loss
of separation, aircraft trajectories, relative headings of the two aircraft, etc. Each conﬂict
parameter is a ﬂoating point or an integer value. We range over its values by specifying
an interval with a lower bound, an upper bound, and a step between neighboring values to
be extracted from the interval. We draw parameter speciﬁcations from input ﬁles, one line
specifying one parameter, as illustrated in the following:
ttLOS, DOUBLE, "[400.0 to 540.0 step 20.0]"
relativeHeading, DOUBLE, "[20.0 to 180.0 step 20.0]"
airspeed, DOUBLE, "[450.0 to 550.0 step 50.0]"
For each conﬂict, we then explore the full Cartesian product of the ranges of all the
parameters involved. However, we do not explore all combinations of parameters across
conﬂicts. Rather, we create test cases by picking one set of generated values for each conﬂict,
and covering all possible combinations of parameter values for each conﬂict. During this
process, we avoid having the same time to loss of separation among conﬂicts in each test
case by using diﬀerent oﬀsets in the order in which their respective values are picked.
4.4.3 Generating Secondary Conflicts
Properties P3 and P4 require for us to generate not simply additional aircraft, but also to
strategically position them so that they generate secondary conﬂicts. In particular, we must
create test cases that include secondary aircraft with which a resolved trajectory creates
more and less imminent conﬂicts. If we were to take a random approach where we would
include secondary aircraft without a speciﬁc goal, it would be extremely diﬃcult to generate
such test cases. We therefore decided to take control over positioning the secondary aircraft,
in the same way that our wrapper takes control over generating initial conﬂicts.
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The main challenge in generating secondary conﬂicts is the fact that we do not, a priori,
know the resolution that AutoResolver will produce for a particular conﬂict. To deal with
this problem, we develop the following approach, as illustrated in Figure 4.4. Let T1 and T2
be the trajectories of two aircraft in conﬂict, and assume that AutoResolver produces a
resolution for T1.
1. Monitor the behavior of AutoResolver and obtain the produced resolution. Gen-
erate a resolution trajectory T ′1.
2. Select a point in T ′1 to which the secondary aircraft ﬂies (black dot in Figure 4.4).
Use existing algorithms to ﬂy the secondary aircraft backwards to the selected point
and generate a trajectory T3. The secondary aircraft will thus be in conﬂict with the
resolution trajectory produced by AutoResolver.
3. Create a test case with T1, T2, T3.
Similarly to test case generation of initial aircraft encounters, we want to parameterize
the generation of secondary aircraft in order to be able to create interesting test cases. For
example, we want to vary the time at which the secondary conﬂict occurs. For a desired
time t to a secondary conﬂict, we pick an appropriate point in the resolution trajectory
(the point at which the aircraft will be at time t), and create a secondary aircraft to reach
that point also in time t, with the method discussed in Section 4.2.2. This enables us to
create secondary conﬂicts that are both more and less imminent than the initial conﬂict. We
also want to vary heading and velocity of the secondary aircraft, among other parameters.
Finally, we need to make sure that when AutoResolver deals with the generated test case,
it will still select T1 and T2 as the ﬁrst conﬂict to resolve. In other words, if the secondary







Figure 4.4. Loss of separation resolution and introduced secondary conﬂict. Left: conﬂict
in the near future. Center: resolution that will prevent loss of separation. Right: secondary
conﬂict introduced along the resolution trajectory.
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than the conﬂict between T1 and T2, then AutoResolver will select the former conﬂict
to resolver ﬁrst, and therefore we no longer have control over the creation of the resolution
trajectory with which we create a conﬂict.
To address this last issue, we use a runtime monitor that, prior to generating the test
case including a secondary, checks whether the secondary aircraft has a conﬂict with the
initial trajectories, and only generates a test case if the latter conﬂict is less imminent than
the initial conﬂict. In other words, a test case such as above is only generated if the conﬂict
between T1 and T2 is more imminent than both 1) a conﬂict between T1 and T3, if such a
conﬂict exists, and 2) a conﬂict between T2 and T3, if it exists.
In summary, we use runtime monitors to query the behavior of AutoResolver and
generate complex secondary scenarios in a strategic fashion. In this novel use of runtime
monitoring for test-case generation, the software under test serves as a solver of our con-
straints for producing the test cases.
4.5 Verification and Monitoring
A new component of the framework was developed to support veriﬁcation and monitoring
capabilities: monitoring the execution of AutoResolver, checking if properties hold, and
recording property violations and other information to appropriate log ﬁles.
Log ﬁles for property violations let the AutoResolver team focus on those test cases
that violate the properties, instead of manually examining results of millions of test cases.
These log ﬁles provide information analogous to a regression test suite: if there is a test
case violating any of the properties, a report will be written to the log ﬁles. Log ﬁles for
the information monitor report detailed information on every aircraft conﬂict for every test
case and how the picked conﬂict resolution’s type changes over time.
4.5.1 Monitoring Information and Properties
One of the goals of this work was to keep AutoResolver’s source code intact through-
out the veriﬁcation. What is usually done when verifying a software is to instrument its
source code with inlined commands needed for a veriﬁcation task. The motivation behind
avoiding such an invasive approach is the fact that we did not want to interfere with the
ongoing development of AutoResolver.
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Instead of modifying AutoResolver at the source code level, we added a veriﬁcation
component to our framework. The AutoResolver software is written in the Java pro-
gramming language. Java compiles to Java bytecode, an intermediate language of the
Java Virtual Machine. The veriﬁcation component is written in the AspectJ language.
AspectJ is an aspect-oriented programming extension to Java. It comes with a modiﬁed
Java compiler that weaves the code of the component into AutoResolver’s bytecode. This
way we have AutoResolver’s code interleaved with our veriﬁcation code at the bytecode
level only, thus leaving AutoResolver’s source code unmodiﬁed.
For every property and the monitor introduced in Section 4.3, we have one aspect in
the component. An aspect is an analog of a Java class. It consists of regular Java code
in addition to pointcuts and advices. Pointcuts are moments in a program execution, e.g.,
an occurrence of a method call. Advices are actions to be taken before and/or after the
pointcuts, e.g., fetching a return value after a method call.
In order to implement the runtime veriﬁcation, we had to identify parts of AutoRe-
solver’s source code pertaining to the properties and monitor. Once the parts were
identiﬁed, we were able to write aspects — consisting of pointcuts and advices — that
implement the properties and monitor. The pointcuts also reach into the framework since
the aspects initialize various parameters on the boundary from the framework to AutoRe-
solver. Furthermore, the aspects reach into test cases exercising the framework and
AutoResolver, again initializing parameters before a test case starts or outputting results
after a test case execution or when a whole test suite ends with its execution. An example
of a pointcut and an advice applied before the pointcut is shown in Listing 4.1.
Every aspect is instantiated at the beginning of a framework execution and it monitors
an execution of each test case in a test suite, independently of other aspects.
pointcut executionJUnitTestMethod ( ) :
execution (public void t e s t ∗ ( ) ) &&
within ( TestCase+) &&
! cflow (myAspect ( ) ) ;
before ( ) : executionJUnitTestMethod ( ) {
currentTime = 0 . 0 ;
re so lut ionIn foMap =
new HashMap<Aircra f t IDPai r , ArrayList<Reso lut ion In fo >>() ;
}
Listing 4.1. A pointcut and advice initializing parameters before a JUnit test case method
execution.
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Some information the aspect observes and collects is written to log ﬁles after every test case,
like the resolutionInfoMap data structure in Listing 4.1, while the rest of the information
is written to the ﬁles only at the end of a test suite execution.
The resolution monitor modiﬁes each JUnit test case and executes it at nine diﬀerent
time points. The resulting executions represent a class of test cases with the exact same
aircraft trajectories. However, for each delay time, all aircraft involved in the test case are
ﬁrst ﬂown for the speciﬁed amount of time prior to invoking the AutoResolver’s conﬂict
detection and resolution process. This is equivalent to generating and executing nine times
as many test cases as in the original JUnit test suite. A pointcut and advice that achieve
the runtime modiﬁcation and execution are shown in Listing 4.2.
In testing AutoResolver, we made it easy to focus on speciﬁc properties or the
runtime monitor through a conﬁguration ﬁle. The ﬁle contains key-value pairs, where a key
represents one of the properties or the monitor, and a value is either enabled or disabled,
allowing or disallowing the property or the monitor to be exercised, respectively. Note that
when the information monitor is enabled, each test case results in multiple invocations to
AutoResolver, one for each resolution delay that is introduced. In addition to that, all
enabled property monitors are also active and checked as AutoResolver is invoked. For
each test case, we therefore checked all enabled properties at all resolution delay time points.
4.5.2 Monitoring the Monitors
In their previous work [GHI+14], Giannakopoulou et al. measured and compared coverage
of generated test suites in terms of both standard structural coverage criteria, but also in
terms of the sets of attempted and successful resolutions.
pointcut callAR (AacTestWrapper wrapper ) :
ca l l (public ArrayList runCon f l i c tDet e c t i onReso lu t i on ( ) ) &&
target ( wrapper ) &&
! cflow (myAspect ( ) ) &&
! cflow ( cal lFlyForMethod (∗ , ∗) ) &&
i f ( i sEnabled ) ;
after (AacTestWrapper wrapper ) : callAR ( wrapper ) {
for ( t = 6 0 . 0 ; t <= 480 . 0 ; t += 60 . 0 ) {
AacTestWrapper w = wrapper . f l yFor ( t ) ;
w. runCon f l i c tDe t e c t i onReso lu t i on ( ) ;
}
}
Listing 4.2. A pointcut and advice delaying the conﬂict detection and resolution process for
every JUnit test case.
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When properties are introduced into the system, we have the opportunity to introduce
additional coverage criteria for the generated test suites. In particular, we wished to make
sure that our test suites include enough diﬀerent scenarios to exercise the logic of all the
properties that are to be checked in the system. One can view this as a type of “property
coverage” criterion. If no test case exercises a particular property, our testing process satisﬁes
this property “vacuously.”
Let us consider property P4, for example. This property requires that a picked resolution
does not create a more imminent secondary conﬂict. One can imagine this property as having
two branches, one for the case where a secondary conﬂict is created as a result of a resolution
trajectory, and one where it is not. The ﬁrst branch consists of two branches, one where the
secondary conﬂict is more imminent than the original one, and one where it is less imminent.
To cover this property, we therefore would like to have test cases that cover all three logical
branches.
Similarly, property P3 checks whether secondary conﬂicts are added to the list of conﬂicts
in the correct order. In order to check the logic of this property, we must generate test cases
that create secondary conﬂicts within the AutoResolver time horizon, so that they are
eligible to be added to the list of conﬂicts.
To evaluate the quality of our generated test suites with respect to a set of properties,
we introduced runtime monitors, which in essence observed whether the property monitors
are exercised properly. This can be performed by extending the property monitor itself.
For example, for property P3, we extended the property monitor to additionally record
the number of calls made to the method that adds secondary conﬂicts to an existing list
of conﬂicts. Alternatively, it can be performed by introducing a new monitor. Since the
lifespan of aspects is through a test suite, it is easy to aggregate such test-suite coverage
results.
4.6 Experimental Evaluation
In this section, we report results on verifying the properties and running the monitor
introduced in Section 4.3. We analyze if each of the properties holds and what insights this
gives us into how AutoResolver operates. For the monitor, we look at the data it outputs
and what it means.
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4.6.1 Experimental Setup
Experiments were run on a 32-core computer with 128 GB of RAM in the Debian
GNU/Linux operating system in the Emulab network testbed [WLS+02]. The experiments
consist of generating test cases for AutoResolver, as described in Section 4.4.2, and then
checking the properties and running the monitor while executing the test cases, as explained
in Section 4.5. Every JUnit test case we generate consists of ﬁve independent initial conﬂicts,
which equals to ﬁve pairs of aircraft, each pair ﬂying to a conﬂict point. In addition, there
is another aircraft in the test case intended to cause a secondary conﬂict if AutoResolver
were to choose the same conﬂict resolution for one of the conﬂicts in the presence of the
additional aircraft.
It took 2.08 seconds on average to execute a test case. Given that it takes so long to
execute a test case and that we generated 3.5 million test cases in total, we decided to
implement the producer-consumer problem in the framework. The producer is the test case
generator where each consumption unit is a batch of 5000 test cases. In the experiments, we
employed 30 consumers, each consumer executing one batch at a time. With the producer-
consumer approach, it took us about three days to run the test cases compared to about 84
days it would take us if we executed them sequentially.
One thing to note is that, as explained in Section 4.5, every test case is modiﬁed and
executed in nine diﬀerent ways at runtime. Eﬀectively, this means we executed not 3.5
million test cases, but 31.5 million modiﬁed test cases. Thanks to the runtime modiﬁcations
of every test case representing multiple conﬂict scenarios, we were able to check all the
properties for the same scenarios, but at diﬀerent time points.
4.6.2 Property Checking / System Monitoring
In this section, we present the results we obtained from the runtime monitors that we
implemented as oracles during the execution of our generated tests.
P1: There should be a resolution for every conflict. Monitoring of this property identiﬁed
several test cases for which AutoResolver was not able to produce a resolution. All these
cases fall within four categories, as reported by the output of AutoResolver. Three
categories have to do with the conﬂict time. More precisely, there are some conﬂicts that
AutoResolver considers outside (before or after) its time horizon. For really imminent
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conﬂicts, tools such as TSafe [GBS+11] and TCAS [KÐ07] are in charge. For conﬂicts that
are far enough in the future (how far in the future is conﬁgurable), it is often better to wait
and see how they evolve before trying to resolve them. After all, each aircraft maneuver
that is to be applied is disruptive in one way or another. There are also cases identiﬁed
as “planes already in violation,” which means that the initial states of the trajectories are
already in loss of separation.
The fourth category produces a message that we could not directly interpret based on
our prior experience with the tool: “Neither plane able to maneuver/neither plane able to
be unfrozen.” The AutoResolver developers informed us that this happens when aircraft
involved in a conﬂict have already received a resolution in this round. By reviewing the
logs from these test cases, we conﬁrmed that this was indeed the case. This is the type of
behavior that we could not observe with the single-conﬂict test cases of our previous work.
The behavior of AutoResolver in all these cases is therefore as expected. Relating
to the conﬂicts that fall outside of the AutoResolver time horizon, one could reﬁne the
property monitor to exclude such cases from being reported. Alternatively, to keep the
property general, one could simply create ﬁlters to be applied oﬄine to the logged test
cases. One could also create parameterized runtime monitors that allow to conﬁgure the
time window within which the target separation assurance algorithm is expected to operate.
P2: Initial conflicts are resolved in the nondecreasing order of their first time to loss of
separation. We did not detect any violations of this property.
P3: New conflicts arising as a result of conflict resolution should be inserted into the list
of conflicts according to their first loss of separation time. We did not detect any violations
of this property.
P4: No picked resolution is allowed to cause a more imminent secondary conflict. Our
framework initially reported several violations of this property, with the following message,
for example:
Resolution for conflict: (ac1=1, ac2=2) ttlos = 75.0 [s], res type = 13 is causing a more
imminent conflict with ac3=3 with ttlos = 0.0 [s]
We observed that in all the cases reported, the more imminent secondary conﬂict that
occurs as a result of applying a resolution maneuver occurs immediately, with ttlos equal
to 0.0. We performed several tests to conﬁrm that our runtime monitor was detecting a
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real violation, and that our runtime monitor does not have a bug. In trying to understand
these violations with the AutoResolver team, we provided to them detailed trajectories
involved in one of these test cases. One of the developers observed the fact that in our test
cases, the initial point of the original trajectory did not coincide with the initial point of its
corresponding resolution trajectory.
This fact exposed a bug in our wrapper, which we had not discovered previously. In
debugging the issue, we noticed that when our ACES stub creates a trajectory, the ﬁrst
point that it adds to the trajectory is the ﬁrst point to which the aircraft ﬂies. In other
words, all the trajectories generated by our stub are oﬀset by ﬁve seconds (trajectory points
are ﬁve seconds away from each other). This is not a serious problem since it does not really
matter what the initial point of an aircraft is, for the purpose of our testing. However, when
the ACES stub is asked to create a trajectory that starts at a particular initial point I, it is
reasonable to expect that the ﬁrst trajectory point will coincide with I.
Despite this fact, we were surprised that AutoResolver produced a resolution with a
more imminent secondary conﬂict. We were expecting that when a resolution is attempted,
AutoResolver would check whether it creates more imminent conﬂicts. Since the conﬂict
detection algorithm detects such a conﬂict, how is it possible that AutoResolver selects
the resolution? After several interactions with the AutoResolver developers on this issue,
we realized that the logic of the algorithms used assumes that the initial point of original
and resolution trajectories are the same. When we updated the ACES stub, the violations
to this property disappeared.
This attests to the correctness of our runtime monitor. Runtime veriﬁcation thus proves
invaluable in debugging and understanding a system under test, which is impossible without
the use of test oracles to assist in this process. We identiﬁed an issue with our ACES stub,
but also discovered an implicit assumption made by the logic of AutoResolver. We believe
that this feedback was useful to the AutoResolver team. An assumption is made that
the trajectory generator will always create trajectories with a speciﬁc initial point, but why
not robustify the logic to work correctly if a trajectory generator does not exactly satisfy
this criterion?
M1: For each conflict, report its resolution type and how it changes over time. This
monitor produces, for each conﬂict of each test case, a report that looks as in Table 4.1.
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Table 4.1. Resolution delay and resulting resolution types. Nonresolved conﬂict 1 is
reported as being “before AutoResolver horizon,” and 2 reports “planes already in
violation.” Resolution types are represented as integers in AutoResolver.








10.0 420.0 not resolved
1
0.0 480.0 not resolved
2
This report allows for an easy inspection of how the produced resolution type changes
when conﬂict resolution is postponed. Visual inspection is of course not the aim of our
work. Monitor M1 produces about 20GB of logged data. This information opens up many
opportunities for data analysis. One could, for example, try to calculate the average, or
minimum, or maximum delay at which the produced resolution type changes. One could also
look for characteristics of outlier cases. Through observation of the reports, for example, we
noticed some cases that look irregular; for example, it was sometimes the case that a conﬂict
ahead disappears and then reappears between two aircraft, which is not very intuitive. In
other cases, the resolution type changed very early, where in most cases, the resolution type
only changed when we delay by at least a couple of minutes.
4.6.3 Property Coverage
As discussed, in addition to checking properties, we introduced monitors that check
whether properties are exercised appropriately by the executed test suite. Our test suite
exercised all properties appropriately except for property P3. We were puzzled by this
behavior. For this reason, we additionally monitored whether we generate test cases with
the following characteristic: a resolution is picked that introduces a less imminent conﬂict
than the original one, and the secondary conﬂict is within the AutoResolver horizon.
After conﬁrming this fact, we had extensive discussions with the AutoResolver team,
and discovered that for the types of conﬂicts that we are implementing (called en-route),
secondary conﬂicts are not handled in the current iteration of AutoResolver. Rather,
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they are left to be detected in the next invocation of the tool. Only weather conﬂicts, which
we had not yet incorporated in our framework, may exercise this behavior.
4.7 Lessons Learned
Testing without oracles is a shot in the dark. The NextGen team and we thought that
through the years of trying to understand how to generate test cases and stubs for a complex
system like AutoResolver, we had learned many aspects of its behavior. However, the
pace at which we discover new aspects of its logic has increased signiﬁcantly with the
introduction of runtime monitors. Monitoring the system has helped us identify assumptions
of the AutoResolver logic, categories of unresolved conﬂicts that we were unaware of,
as well as bugs in our own wrapper code (after all, the wrapper is a part of our system
under test) that Giannakopoulou et al. had not previously discovered despite extensive
testing [GHI+14]. This is without counting all the information that the AutoResolver
team expects to learn from the recorded data by the information monitor.
Strategic test-case generation and property monitoring are valuable tools in the hands
of developers. In presenting our results to the wider separation assurance team, there
were two things that sparked their enthusiasm. The ﬁrst was the novel way in which we
generate secondary aircraft. Of our other test-case generation work, they said that “we have
done somewhat similar work for our own basic testing, although not nearly as advanced or
ﬂexible.” However, they said that “we have never seen anything remotely similar to this way
of generating secondary conﬂicts; it is very novel and interesting.”
The second aspect of our work that they believed can make a real impact in the way
they test their software is the runtime monitoring. They believed that veriﬁcation through
monitoring can signiﬁcantly facilitate their testing and regression processes. They also
appreciated the fact that monitors do not interfere with their development.
Properties trigger the creation of new properties. From this, but also others’ past
experience with TSafe [GBS+11], it is clear that the best way to identify properties
of complicated algorithms is to start from simple ones, and show the value to system
developers. The capability to create logs of tests that identify several characteristics of
interest immediately creates a desire in the team to monitor additional aspects of the system.
This is a great opportunity for formal methods experts to get their hands on real systems.
91
Of course, it comes at the price of a signiﬁcant engineering eﬀort, which, in the NextGen
team’s case, has spanned over several years. However, the potential impact of our work
makes the eﬀort worthwhile and rewarding.
Our information monitor also opens up opportunities for applying a variety of data
analysis and mining techniques in this domain. One example of properties that we have not
yet explored are properties that compare resolutions across consecutive rounds of operation
of AutoResolver. The diﬀerence from our current information monitor is that instead
of ﬂying aircraft in order to delay the resolution process, we would actually apply the
picked resolutions, and invoke AutoResolver again on the resolved trajectories, at the
next time point according to the frequency of invocation. We are inspired to specify such
properties from work on analyzing the ACAS X system [vEG14]. In that work, an example
of undesirable behavior is described as “reversals,” which describes a situation where the
same aircraft is advised to climb and subsequently to descend. Such maneuvers are extremely
disruptive to the pilot.
Runtime monitoring is useful for test-case generation. In this work, we used runtime
monitoring in conventional ways, to check properties of the system under test, but also in
innovative ways, to generate test cases that are hard to generate with other techniques. In
particular, there are two such interesting examples. The ﬁrst one has to do with creating
secondary conﬂicts. In this example, the system under test is used as a “constraint solver”; it
informs our test-case generation tool of the resolution that AutoResolver would pick for
a speciﬁc conﬂict. We believe that such an approach could be applicable in many real-world
scenarios where we are required to solve constraints that are very particular to a speciﬁc
application.
The second case is where the runtime monitor captures information from one test case,
modiﬁes it, and subsequently runs the modiﬁed test case, as performed by our information
monitor. M1 modiﬁes each test case at runtime to eﬀectively generate a whole class of
related test cases with the same aircraft setup, but across time.
4.8 Related Work
In the research ﬁeld of runtime veriﬁcation, researchers have explored a number of
formalisms, usually with a trade-oﬀ between expressiveness and performance. Java PathEx-
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plorer [HR04] checks an execution of a Java program against user-provided properties and
analyzes the program for deadlocks and data races. LogFire [Hav14] is a rule-based runtime
veriﬁcation system based on a pattern-matching algorithm for implementing production rule
systems. JavaMOP [CR07] enables the user to specify properties using a formalism, and
automatically generates monitors in AspectJ from the speciﬁcation. Even though we could
have used a tool such as JavaMOP in this work, we did not need its expressiveness, hence we
encoded the requirements in AspectJ directly. For an overview of the runtime veriﬁcation
ﬁeld, see Leucker and Schallhart [LS09]. Runtime veriﬁcation is also used in software-fault
monitoring; Delgado et al. [DGR04] provide a taxonomy and a classiﬁcation of software-fault
monitoring systems.
A combination of test-case generation and runtime veriﬁcation has been explored by
others working on runtime veriﬁcation. The jUnitRV tool [DLT13] extends the JUnit unit
testing framework with annotations that are generated from a user-speciﬁed temporal logic
formula. The tool manipulates Java bytecode at runtime. Artho et al. [ABG+05] use an
input-output model to automatically generate test cases enriched with veriﬁcation proper-
ties. The test cases are generated using symbolic execution and the properties are analyzed
by applying runtime veriﬁcation to execution traces. In their approach, the system under
test is instrumented manually so that events of interest are recorded in the execution traces.
In our work, runtime veriﬁcation is instrumental in test-case generation, and instrumentation
is done automatically at the Java bytecode level, without aﬀecting the source code of the
software under test. Furthermore, in our work, runtime monitors and test cases are separate,
oﬀering the ﬂexibility to apply any selection of runtime monitors to any selection of test cases
(whether generated automatically or manually).
The oracle problem of identifying correct output, which we faced in this line of work,
is also approached by metamorphic testing [ZHT+04]. Chen et al. [CCY98] show how to
augment passing test cases in metamorphic testing with the goal of revealing undetected
errors in software.
The AutoResolver system has previously been integrated and evaluated with other
National Airspace System (NAS) simulations [MT08, PHM+09, Thi08]. Moreover, in pre-
vious work, Giannakopoulou et al. tested TSafe [GBS+11], a NextGen component that
also targets separation assurance, but at a shorter time horizon. That work also identiﬁes
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properties to be tested, but these properties involve the input and output data of the system,
and therefore do not require more involved monitoring, as in this work. Moreover, the input
space of TSafe is much smaller than that of AutoResolver, making test-case generation
simpler.
Several researchers have addressed the challenge of generating structurally complex
inputs with white- and black-box techniques. Techniques range from using declarative
speciﬁcations of the test inputs [BKM02, GGJ+10] to white-box techniques based on concolic
execution for security testing [GLM12]. MACE [CBP+11] combines black- and white-box
techniques such as active automata learning and concolic execution in order to increase code
coverage. A lot of research combines the techniques to generate method sequences and input
values for primitive parameter types and objects [TH08, IX08, TXT+11, DR13, PLEB07,
GIB+13]. Arnold and Alexander [AA13] generate complex tests based on an automated
approach to generating content for computer games. Other researchers rely on program
invariants inferred from executions in generating test cases [BDS06, CSX08].
As mentioned, other test-case generation approaches can be added to our framework
such as plain random input generation, concolic execution, combinatorial testing, and evo-
lutionary test case generation [PHP99]. The use of such techniques is only made possible
by our implementation of a wrapper to tame the input space of AutoResolver.
4.9 Conclusion
The presented work here is based on several years of work with experts in aircraft
separation assurance to develop a lightweight testing environment for the AutoResolver
tool. In this work, we particularly focused on specifying and monitoring properties of the
AutoResolver algorithms during testing. We discussed how we implemented property
and information monitors in the AspectJ language, allowing us to log several aspects of
the system without interfering with its source code.
To eﬀectively exercise properties of interest of the system, we had to generate sophisti-
cated test cases. To this aim, we used runtime monitoring in innovative ways, both as an
oracle for constraint solving, and as a generator of classes of related test cases.
Note that in this work, we did not focus on experimenting with diﬀerent test-case
generation tools. Rather, we focused on creating appropriate interfaces around AutoRe-
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solver, which tame its input space of trajectories into parameterized scenarios that can be
handled by test-case generation tools. Here we used a simple black-box test-case generation
algorithm.
We automatically generated and eﬃciently executed millions of test cases, and discovered
errors and vulnerabilities in the system consisting of AutoResolver and our wrapper code.
We also gained new insights in the logic of the algorithms. The separation assurance team at
NASA Ames has expressed interest in incorporating our work more widely. One possible way
to extend the framework is in creating generic monitor templates for separation assurance,
that can be conﬁgured to work with a variety of tools and algorithms in that domain.
Finally, the AutoResolver team would like us to stress-test the system by placing
conﬂict points closer together, for example, and thus having aircraft from diﬀerent conﬂicts
interfere with each other. They are also interested in classifying input tests for which the
AutoResolver may not be able to produce a resolution. In general, the information we
produce opens many opportunities for further analysis.
Even though we have so far focused our work on air-traﬃc control algorithms, the
approaches that we have developed are relevant in other domains. For example, techniques
described here could be applied in the car industry to test algorithms for self-driving cars.
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
This concludes the dissertation. In it, we presented three lines of work revolving around
automatic software testing. All three lines extended and applied several testing techniques
in novel ways with the goal of increasing software reliability.
In Chapter 2 on automatic testing in malware detection, we analyzed how automatic soft-
ware techniques can be used to build high-quality detectors of malicious software behavior.
In particular, we looked at how the type and size of input in automatic random testing aﬀects
four quality measures in various machine learning-based binary classiﬁers. We applied this
analysis to thousands of applications for the Android operating system. Results showed that
the classiﬁers can be built eﬃciently based on simple inputs guiding application execution.
The quality of the classiﬁers was aﬀected only negligibly when varying the number of inputs
from several hundred to several thousand.
In the ﬁrst stage of this work, we were planning to employ dynamic symbolic execution
in driving application execution. However, there was no ready-to-use dynamic symbolic
execution engine for Android applications; hence, we decided to start with random testing
and ﬁrst see results this approach gives. We were pleasantly surprised by preliminary results
and good quality detectors, which made us revisit both our original plan with symbolic
execution and earlier work of others on malware detection with heavyweight techniques.
Detectors we have built are robust and not dependent on particular applications, as
shown by our analysis. They provide insights into how diﬀerent conﬁgurations in testing
inﬂuence detectors. Random testing was shown to be eﬀective and did not leave much room
for improvement that more advanced and complex techniques can bring.
With Chapter 3, we introduced a technique for automatic test case generation for object-
oriented software. As explained in the chapter, the challenge was in generating objects of
arbitrary complex classes in the subtyping polymorphism sense. The motivation behind this
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work is in the fact that covering more code with automatic testing triggers more faulty sites
in a software code base. Therefore, we needed to cover as much of code full of objects,
where each object is generated by either following an unspeciﬁed protocol or by setting up
an uncovered state in which an object can be generated.
There we combined two well-known existing automatic testing techniques. The combina-
tion consists of feedback-directed random testing and dynamic symbolic execution, forming
a novel technique that eliminates drawbacks of both underlying techniques. Random testing
provided us with call sequences that broadly explored execution states, while symbolic
execution enabled us to explore the neighborhood of a state in detail. Our extensive
evaluation of the technique on a scale that has not been undertaken before showed on a
wide range of benchmarks that the combined technique provides modest improvements in
code coverage over the feedback-directed random testing technique.
Chapter 4 addressed the challenge of automatically testing and checking properties of
an optimization system. It is diﬃcult to capture correctness of states in an optimization
system as computed states in it are compared in relative terms to each other, and not against
an unknown optimal state. There we proposed an automatic software testing technique
for NASA’s AutoResolver aircraft collision avoidance system. First we formulated four
veriﬁcation properties and one information property. The properties we formulated gave us
clarity, i.e., something we could work with in terms of testing and veriﬁcation.
In a novel way, our technique interleaved a black-box test case generation approach
with runtime analysis and veriﬁcation to 1) guide the iterative construction of complex test
cases that stress-tested the system, and 2) check if the four properties hold for in-ﬂight
scenarios given in the automatically generated test cases. The technique enabled us to use
the system under test in an interesting way by both putting it into a position of a test case
generator and an oracle to correctness of simpler scenarios that were consequently used in
constructing complex aircraft scenarios. Test cases we generated were generic and without
properties baked in. Rather, properties were speciﬁed in and checked on the ﬂy by the
veriﬁcation framework, thereby decoupling test case generation and property speciﬁcation
and veriﬁcation.
Our approach in testing the aircraft collision avoidance system led to discovery of errors
and vulnerabilities in the system comprising AutoResolver and our testing framework.
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With the work, we gained new insights in the logic of the algorithms in the AutoResolver
system. The AutoResolver team’s airspace engineers were happy to be provided with
an automatic test case generation and veriﬁcation framework for AutoResolver. This
signiﬁcantly improved over their manual testing process. The framework enabled them to
develop new features and test their behavior more rapidly and with higher conﬁdence of
correctness.
With these three chapters of the dissertation, we demonstrated our thesis that automatic
software testing can be combined with machine learning, dynamic symbolic execution, and
runtime veriﬁcation to broaden its applicability.
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